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Competition in the Market for Takeover Advisers 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the attributes of takeovers that motivate bidders to engage advisers, the factors 
bidders consider when choosing the prestige of advisers and whether advisers that capture greater value for 
the bidder gain additional market share. The results indicate that advisers are more likely to be chosen in 
takeovers that are large, hostile, and involve a range of payment methods. Higher ranked advisers are 
shown to facilitate deal completion. An alternative league table is also created and tested. The results show 




The Australian market for takeover advisers is large. In 1998 the market value of announced takeover bids 
was $41.0bn, of which $34.0bn worth of deals had at least one adviser involved. However, there is no legal 
requirement to use an adviser in a takeover which suggests that the expected value-added by the dvisers 
exceeds their expected fees. The first question is what attributes of a takeover motivate some bidders to 
hire advisers. 
 
Historically, advisers were kept on retainers by larger firms. However, Bowers and Miller (1990) observe 
that, in recent times, “investment bankers are acting as independent agents in the marketplace, no longer 
looking at long term relationships with individual firms”, and that the expansion of the takeover market 
during the late 1980s prompted the move away from “relationship banking”. However, the lack of an on-
going contractual commitment between advisers nd their clients increased the need for advisers to convey 
their relative quality in a credible, public way to potential clients.  
 
Advisers can use a variety of signals to convey quality. One very visible signal is the annual takeover 
adviser league table. The Securities Data Corporation (henceforth SDC) database used to prepare the 
league table is compiled independently and ranks advisers on the basis of volume of completed takeovers 
over the previous 12 months. A high ranking is typically interpreted as a sign that the adviser is of high 
quality. In any event, advisers compete fiercely to be ranked higher. However, whether the league table, as 
currently compiled, identifies adviser quality is debatable, given that rankings are based on volume of 
deals completed rather than value-added in a takeover. The second question examined in this paper is what 
factors do bidders consider when choosing the prestige level of an adviser. In particular, we are interested 
in whether bidders value wealth creation. 
                                                     
* This paper has benefited from comments of David Emanuel (the discussant) and participants at the Third Annual 
Summer Research School hosted by The Accounting Foundation at the University of Sydney and the School of 
Accounting at the University of Technology, Sydney in February 2000, the PACAP/FMA Conference, Melbourne in 
June 2000 and the Asia-Pacific Finance Association Conference, Shanghai, in July 2000. The authors also wish to 
thank Tig Ihnatko for econometric advice and Emily Rosier for help with data collection. 
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In theory takeovers should only be undertaken if they have a positive net present value. The literature 
generally concludes that the greatest returns in takeovers go to target shareholders, and that bidder returns 
are close to zero or at times negative. A higher quality adviser may be able to ensure bidder shareholders 
retain a greater proportion of the gains generated by the takeover1. If advis r rankings are interpreted as 
quality rankings, then potentially a key determinant of an increase in market shr s the economic rents 
captured for the bidder. If the league table conveys true quality, then higher ranked advisers should be 
extracting greater rents for heir clients. The third question addressed in this paper investigates whether 
there an association between adviser ranking on the league table and the economic rents earned by the 
bidder. 
 
In summary, this paper examines three questions. Firstly, what deal attributes motivate some bidders to 
engage advisers? Secondly, what factors do bidders consider when choosing the prestige level of an 
adviser, in particular, do higher ranked advisers capture greater value for their clients? Finally, is capturing 
greater wealth for the bidder associated with a greater market share? Thus, this paper examines if the 
current league table conveys adviser quality. 
 
Motivation 
Overcoming agency costs and aligning principal and agent incentives is an important issue in all economic 
transactions. Although explicit contractual clauses can go a long way towards aligning incentives, 
contracts are not complete, and future events are uncertain. The principal agent relationship which exists 
between a takeover adviser (the agent), and a bidder (the principal) is an example of a contract in which 
the interests of the agent may diverge from the interest of the principal. The bidder should be interested in 
maximising its wealth, and the takeover adviser in maximising its current and future revenues. 
 
In order to charge higher fees, the adviser must be perceived to offer a superior service. One way to signal 
quality and superior skill is to be ranked highly on a league table. The prestige conferred by being high on 
the league table builds up reputational capital, which is used as a marketing tool (Riva (1997)). Since the 
league table ranks advisers on their completed deals during the past calendar year, there is an incentive for 
advisers to focus more on deal completion than adding value. Rau (1999) finds support for advisers 
focusing on deal completion, almost exclusively. Very little support is found for advisers being able to
create value for the bidder. 
 
                                                     
1 If the market for corporate control is perfectly competitive, the target will capture most of the gains associated with 
a takeover. Accordingly the role of a bidder adviser might be to minimise bidder losses. 
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This paper aims to shed additional light on Rau’s (1999) US results. Since the main aim of a takeover 
should be to add value to bidder shareholders, it seems economically questionable that deal completion 
takes precedence over adding value. This paper takes the position that research design issues p tially 
explain Rau’s results. These issues are elaborated on in Section IV D. 
 
The league tables that rank takeover advisers use simple rules to generate the rankings. Adding value is not 
taken into consideration by the league table in its current form. Only completed deals are counted.  Further, 
in cases where there are several advisers engaged in a takeover bid, each adviser to a deal is credited with 
the full 100% of the deal value, regardless of the volume of work performed or the risk assumed by the 
adviser. It is therefore debatable whether the curr nt league table captures adviser qual ty. 
 
During the period examined in this paper (1989-1 98) there were some important differences between the 
Australian and overseas markets. These include capital gains tax laws (CGT), the composition of the 
market and the size of the takeovers performed. The more distinctive features of the Australian equiti s 
market are briefly discussed below. 
 
CGT laws in place in Australia during 1989-1998 caused more takeovers to be financed by cash than 
shares, because CGT was applied equally to cash and share consideration i.e., there was no relief in share-
for-share swaps. A target shareholder who accepted cash was certain of his/her ability to pay the CGT, at 
his/her marginal rate of tax. However, a target shareholder who accepted shares was not certain of his/her 
wealth, as the value of the consideration offered might decrease with the share price. In 1998, 91% of 
completed takeovers in Australia were financed by cash (see Ernst & Young Mergers & Acquisitions 
Index (1999)). This is much higher than in the US, where 64% of takeovers were financed by cash (e.g. 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) for bids in the period 1981- 92). 
 
US and Australian takeover markets lso differ on other attributes e.g. Australia has relatively more 
resource stocks, and takeovers performed in Australia are considerably smaller. While the industry 
knowledge advisers need to have is different, the objectives of bidding firms remain as wealth creation 
through deal completion. Hence, despite the Australian market having different attributes, the findings of 
this research should remain applicable in other markets. 
 
In summary, we have several motivations in performing this study: First, we hope to shed additional light 
on the findings of Rau (1999), which seem questionable in efficient markets. Second, we investigate 
whether bidders are able to assess the quality of advisers by using an existing or alternative lea ue t ble. 
Third, we assess whether higher ranked advisers re of higher quality and are thus able to extrac  greater 
rents for the bidder.  
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II . Background 
A Introduction 
This Section develops an understanding of takeover advisers, the tasks they perform and the advantages 
they potentially bring to a takeover. The benefits of using a takeover adviser are balanced against the 
agency cost incurred when the interests of the adviser diverge from those of the bidder. On the basis of the 
evidence in the IPO literature (see Beatty and Ritter (1986)) and elsewhere, it is argued that the 
reputational capital of an adviser reduces the ag ncy cost between the adviser and the bidder. Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994) argue that investors use the investment bank’s past performance to assess credibility, 
thus a league table is a key marketing tool used by advisers to convey their ability and quality. The S ction 
also discusses the league table; how it is calculated, its perceived importance, the benefits of higher 
ranking, and its apparent shortcomings.  
 
B Takeover Advisers 
Takeover advisers are financial intermediaries, who help facilitate takeovers. As the relationship between 
the bidder and adviser is a principal-agent relationship, agency costs are present. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that agency costs are incurred when agents (advisers) depart from value-maximizing 
decisions, and principals (bidders) incur costs to monitor agents and influence their actions. 
 
If an adviser suggests increasing the price offered for the target above the level where all benefits have 
been eroded, then the bidder’s value is likely to be reduced. In this case the better option is to withdraw the 
bid. However, the adviser’s fees are likely to be contingent on deal completion (McLaughlin (1990)), thus 
the adviser will attempt to complete the deal, even if it destroys some of the bidder’s value. Thisstrat gy 
will only work if the adviser does not develop a reputation for closing out deals too early, thereby giving 
value away to the target. To minimise the risk of overpaying, the bidder incurs monitoring costs to ensure 
the price suggested by the advis r is reasonable. Agency costs can be reduced if the adviser’s reputation 
capital is at risk. It takes many years to develop a reputation, thus advisers are reluctant to take great risks 
for fear of damaging their reputational capital. 
 
B.1 The Objectives of the Adviser 
Advisers to bidders can have two objectives: to ensure the deal is completed (deal completion hypothesis, 
Rau (1999)), or to maximise wealth for the bidder (superior deal hypothesis, Rau (1999) andBowers and 
Miller (1990)). These are not necessarily mutually exclusive objectives. Increasing the price offered until 
no other bidder is willing to enter the market can complete a deal. However, this will reduc  the gains (or
increase the losses) for the bidder. Alternatively, the bidder can decide on a maximum price. If a 
competing bidder is willing to pay more than this price, and the bidder pulls out of the deal, bidder 
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shareholders will be better off than if the bidder had focused on deal completion. Hence deal completion 
can be sacrificed in favour of ensuring creation of real value. Nevertheless, it is possible to be the highest 
bidder and still generate value. Deal completion may overrule value creation if managers become 
personally involved (Eccles, Lanes and Wilson (1999)). If managers perceive withdrawing an offer as a 
humiliating loss or if they wish to expand their “corporate empire” at all costs, then it is conceivable that 
deal completion can overrule value creation. The exception to his is the corporate raiders who “fail” to 
acquire the target, but earn large “greenmail” profits. The adviser must therefore balance the two 
objectives, and decide what weight is optimal for each transaction. 
 
Rau (1999) investigates 438 tender offers and 2,683 mergers in the US to establish the determinants of the 
takeover advisers market share. Rau’s sample contains both completed and withdrawn takeovers, and 
covers the time period 1980 to 1994. Rau tests the superior deal hypothesis and the deal completion 
hypothesis by regressing post acquisition performance of the bidder on the market share of the adviser. 
Rau also controls for completion rates, the attitude of the deal, the method of financing and whether the 
deal is challenged. Rau finds support for the deal completion hypothesis, and little support for the superior 
deal hypothesis, suggesting advisers are more interested in completing takeovers than generating value for 
the bidder. This result is seemingly at odds with economic rationality and pr vides a major reason for this 
paper’s examination of the issue in an Australian setting.  
 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) also find no support for the superior deal hypothesis, but Bowers and Miller 
(1990) do find some support in that the combined wealth gain to the bidder and the target is higher when a 
first tier adviser is used. Using a sample of 343 takeovers, Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991) examine the 
premium paid by bidders, and the returns that accrue to acquirers, as a function of their adviser. They find 
evidence to suggest the highest ranked adviser under-performed2 the sixth ranked adviser (****check 
this****), which is inconsistent with the superior deal hypothesis. This paper investigates the superior deal 
hypothesis using the total wealth generated by the takeover, rather than cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) used in the above-mentioned studies. CARs are equally weighted; hence, although the dollar gain 
to two firms of different size may differ substantially, the CARs may be identical.  
 
B.2 Agency Costs between the Adviser and the Bidder 
Agency costs arise when a bidder employs an adviser. The adviser attempts to complete the deal and earn 
its fee, while the bidder is interested in adding as much value as possible3. McLaughlin (1990) argues that 
the existing fee structure in the US could lead to greatly increased agency costs, as advisers have the 
                                                     
2 Performance was measured as the share price premium paid by the bidder. A lower premium was considered to be 
better. 
3 McLaughlin (1990) finds 80% of fees paid to advisers in the US are contingent upon the deals being completed. As 
fees are not disclosed in Australia, the impact of fee structure is unknown. 
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incentive to complete deals irrespective of bidder wealth creation or destruction4. McLaughlin’s (1990, 
1992) papers suggest the method of payment could be altered to reduce agency costs5. Howev r, as the 
market has not attempted to change the advisers’ fee structure, there must be other factors that aid in 
reducing agency costs. McLaughlin argues that placing the advisers’ reputational capital at stake is 
sufficient to reduce agency costs to a level that the bidder finds acceptable.  
 
B.3 Reputational Capital in the IPO Literature 
The concept of reputational capital is well developed in the initial public offering (IPO) literature. The 
earliest reference to hierarchies and differences in ability comes from Hayes (1971). The newer literature
begins with Beatty and Ritter (1986) who use the Akerlof (1970) ‘lemons’ problem to highlight the need of 
a bank to have reputational capital to lend credibility to an IPO. Beatty and Ritter find an inverse 
relationship between reputational capital and IPO underpricing. Later research by Johnson and Miller 
(1988) also finds support for the hypothesis that more prestigious underwriters underprice IPOs less. An 
underwriter who consistently is able to price IPOs close to the market value develops a good reputati n. 
Further, the reputational capital of an investment banker can help reduce agency costs, and lend credibility 
to an IPO. 
 
Working from the Rock (1986) paper, Carter and Manaster (1990) also have results that suggest reputable 
underwriters work on less risky IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) have similar findings when they 
examine venture capital financed firms going public. Megginson and Weiss’ findings suggest the use of a 
venture capitalist significantly reduces the cost of going public.  
 
In more recent research, Nanda and Yun (1997) show that the market value of the lead underwriter 
advising an IPO is directly related to its performance in the IPO. Thus, how the underwriter performs is 
important. Simply choosing a less risky IPO is not sufficient to ensure the reputational capital of the 
underwriter is kept intact. Maintaining reputation requires that the underwriter act with skill. 
 
In summary, the IPO literature shows that underwriters with more reputational capital at stake reduce the 
underpricing risk of the IPOs they advise. Applying this analysis to takeover advisers suggests that 
advisers who have more reputational capital at stake choose to advise takeovers that will minimise the 
damage to their reputational capital. Second, if the adviser does not perform well, then the reputational 
capital of the adviser is diminished. Thus it is in the best long-t rm i terests of the adviser to ensure the 
objectives of its client are achieved.  
 
                                                     
4 Rational bidders are of course aware of these incentives. 
 7
B.4 Reputational Capital and Takeover Advisers 
The takeover adviser reputational literature is not as well developed as it is in IPOs. Early work in the area 
revolves around the issue of agency costs and fees. In the US, most payments to advisers occur on 
successful closure of a deal. That is, the majority of the fees are actually earned upon completion, and the 
payment of the adviser occurs at the end of the takeover, see McLaughlin (1990). In such cases the adviser 
is obliged to assume all or most of the non-completion risk, see McLaughlin (1992). A key strength of an 
adviser is the financial backing it has. If finncial backing is slowly eroded through poor performance in 
takeover negotiations, then reputation will also suffer. Thus non-completion risk can impact on 
reputational capital. Reputational capital should also depend on the value added to the bidder, keeping in 
mind that a completed deal can destroy value for the bidding firm.  
 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) examine why a bidder chooses to use an adviser. The sample is relatively small 
(99 deals with an adviser, and 99 deals without an adviser for bids between 1981-1992). They find an 
adviser is more likely to be hired when a deal is more complex, the transaction is a takeover, and when the 
firm has performed takeovers previously.  
 
Due to the great reliance on contingent fee structure in the US, s eMcLaughlin (1992), it is not surprising 
that Rau (1999) finds deal completion to be the most important function of an adviser6. This is a reflection 
of a rational decision by the adviser to maximise its fee payoff. Although advisers appear to focus on deal 
completion, Rau concludes that in mergers this incentive does not necessarily result in value-destruc io
for the bidder. For tender offers Rau finds that the core aim of the adviser is to ensure the deal is 
completed. Clearly, it is unlikely that clients are indifferent to adding value. However, it is possible that 
the ranking method, and return measure used by Rau are inappropriate. After partitioning his sample into 
“good”7 and “bad” deals, Rau finds that first tier advisers complete the same proportion of “go
other tiers. However, Rau also finds that the return to bidders is higher in tender offers when a first tier 
adviser is used. It is surprising that the same result does not emerge for mergers.  
 
The fact that Rau (1999) finds few differences btween the tiers could be due to the method he uses to rank 
advisers. The advisers are ranked based on their deal values and number of transactions announced. The 
frequency with which an adviser falls into a category i.e., 1-5 (bulg ), 6-20 (major), and 21-30 (sub-major) 
indicates whether the firm over the period of 15 years is a bulge (first tier), major (second tier), or sub-
                                                                                                                                                           
5 McLaughlin (1990, 1992) does not explicitly state different contracting methods, but recognises he is unable to 
account for all the factors which influence agency costs.  
6 In Australia the Corporations Law does not require fees to be disclosed in the Part A or Part B statements [s. 750]. 
Only expenses that are considered to be “very material” need be disclosed, and fees paid to advisers are virtually 
never judged to be “very material”, thus no data on adviser fees are available.  
7 “Good” deals are those that have a positive abnormal return for the bidder du ing the announcement period (day –1 
to +1).  
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major (third tier). The classification is based on data over the full period surveyed and so there is no room 
for advisers to move between tiers. It is evident in Table 4 of Rau (1999) that the second tier advisers 
appear to catch up to the first tier advisers and pass them during the last two periods (four years). This 
suggests some of the reported results may mask the dynamics of the takeover adviser market. 
 
C Takeover League Tables  
There are several ways in which an adviser may be chosen. The decision to use a particular adviser can be 
related to previous interaction with an adviser, recommendation from others, or from credible publicly 
available information. Among credible public information, one of the most important pieces is the takeover 
adviser league table.  
 
C.1 Calculation of League Tables 
The takeover adviser league table is calculated annually. SDC compiles it from publicly available 
information. The rankings are based on the market share, as measured by the sum of ollar value of deals 
completed, achieved by an adviser during the previous calendar year. In order to be included in the league 
table a deal must conform to the following characteristics. 
· The deal must be completed or unconditional during the calendar y ar;
· The target must be Australian; 
· The deal must have had at least one adviser involved. 
Each adviser in a deal is given credit for the deal regardless of the role of the adviser, or the size of its 
contribution. Hence, if two advisers work on the same d al, they will both be credited with the total value 
of the deal. Although the approach has shortcomings it does remove subjectivity. SDC avoids having to 
decide exactly how important each adviser’s contribution was to the outcome of the takeover. Advisers can 
accumulate value during a calendar year by working for both bidders and/or targets. The two are weighted 
equally. The total market is the sum of all takeovers where at least one adviser has been involved, in 1998 
this amounts to $A34.046bn9. The value of all the takeovers an adviser has been involved in is divided by 
the total value of the market. The advisers are then ranked based on their market share. W  question t e 
ability of the league table to capture quality and prestige, and suggest (and test) a ranking method based on 
value created for clients. 
 
C.2 Shortcomings of the League Table 
The calculation of the league table has sever l potential problems. Firstly, withdran takeover offers are 
ignored, and the level of risk assumed by an adviser is not taken into account. If an adviser wants to move 
up the league table, then it could attempt a whole range of deals in the hope that enough are completed to 
increase its ranking on the league table. For this reason one may not be able to compare two advisers based 
                                                     
8 An “experienced good” is where quality can be verified only after purchase (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
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on their achieved market share e.g. if two advisers have the same volume of deals completed during one 
calendar year, but one completes all its deals, and the other completes only half. In this case the league 
table would indicate the two advisers to be of similar quality, when in fact they differ.  
 
Secondly, all advisers in a deal are credited with the full amount of the deal. If set-up costs allow it, there 
may be an incentive for advisers to perform a small amount of work e.g. 5% of the deal, and perform a 
larger number of smaller engagements in large deals. On  m thod by which the volume of work could be 
assessed would be through the amount of fees paid to each adviser. Unfortunately, adviser fees are not 
disclosed in Australia. 
 
Thirdly, risk is ignored in the league table. The greater the number of advisers involved in a deal, the mor  
diversified the project risk. Al o, the more deals performed by an adviser in a year, the more diversified its 
risk will be. Particular deals might be more difficult, yet all deals are credited with a dollar value 
unadjusted for the complexity of the deal and the degree of risk faced by the adviser. Because th  league 
table does not consider complexity and risk, the rankings may not reflect the underlying ability of the 
advisers. 
 
Fourthly, deals are credited to both target and bidder advisers. If an adviser is hired by a target to defend 
the company and the akeover is completed, hen the target adviser (despite being unable to achieve its 
client’s objectives) is credited with the deal. Conversely, a target adviser who successfully fights off a 
bidder is not credited with the deal value. This seems particularly strange in terms of the ostensible 
objectives of the league table. 
 
Finally, SDC also assume that a completed deal adds value to an acquirer. A deal may in fact be value 
destroying for all shareholders involved, yet be counted to improve the ranking of an adviser on the league 
table. A bidder may hire an adviser with the intention of p rforming “greenmail”. If the greenmail 
objective is achieved, then the takeover is abandoned, and the adviser is not credited with the deal value. 
Thus, situations can easily exist where takeovers counted actually destroy economic value, and takeovers 
may not be counted where they achieve the objective of the bidder. 
 
It is understandable that the measure developed by SDC is parsimonious, but its shortcomings reduce the 
usefulness of the league table. As long as all market participants are aware of the measu men  
shortcomings, then the league tables can still serve as a reasonable benchmark, and a credible marketing 
tool. However, there are clear deficiencies associated with the use of the league tables as a reflection of 
quality. 
                                                                                                                                                           
9 In 1998 the top firm was Warburg Dillon Read with 27.6% of the market with deals worth $9.397bn. 
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III . Hypotheses Development 
A Introduction 
The Section builds on the previous work of Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Rau (1999) to develop six 
hypotheses. Servaes and Zenner’s (1996) research is related to the decision to use an adviser, whereas Rau 
(1999) deals with adviser choice. The purposes of the hypotheses below are to test the conclusions drawn 
in the above research, as well as extending the research by considering value created by advisers.  
 
B Use of Adviser Hypotheses 
The decision to use an adviser has most recently been explored by Servaes and Zenner (1996). They tested 
three hypotheses: the transaction costs hypothesis, the information asymmetry hypothesis, and contracting 
cost hypotheses. Examining the results in Servaes and Zenner suggests corporate governance variables 
have no impact on the decision to use an adviser. Based on that observation, the decision has been made to 
retest the transaction cost and the information asymmetry hypotheses in an Australian setting. The two 
hypotheses are set out below. 
 
B.1 The Transaction Cost Hypothesis 
The takeover adviser is in the business of advising bidders and targets, and the bidder is not11. Thus it is 
expected that the adviser is more knowledgeable about takeovers and can perform them at lower costs. 
According to Benston and Smith (1976) the cost savings come from three sources; economies of 
specialisation, scale economies and reduction in search costs. T e knowledge and costs savings can extend 
to ensuring there are no post-acquisition legal implications i.e., the bidder is not involved in any litigation 
for reasons related to the way the takeover was performed. Du  t  th ir specialisation, takeover advisers 
are expected to be able to identify takeover targets, value them, and put together a bid at a lower cost than 
individual firms, ee Servaes and Zenner (1996). Hence, advisers are likely to be hired when thy can save 
on transactions costs.  
 
H1: The greater the transaction costs, the more likely a firm is to use an adviser. 
 
As in Servaes and Zenner (1996) transaction costs will be proxied by the following range of complexity 
measures: size of transaction, diversification of the target, and the previous experience of the bidder. In 
addition the following dummy variables will be used: whether the target and bidder are in the same 
industry, and if the deal is hostile. 
 
                                                     
10 The bidder may still have significant previous experience and firm-sp cific knowledge. 
11 The bidder may still have significant previous experience and firm-sp cific knowledge. 
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B.2 The Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
The decision to use an adviser is likely to be dependent on the degree of information asymmetry that exists 
between the bidder and the target. Information asymmetry can exist for a number of reasons. The target 
and the bidder may operate in significantly different industries, the structure of the two firms may be very 
different; one firm may be listed and the other private. When information asymmetry is great, it is 
expected that an adviser will be hired to provide credibility to the information disclosed as part of the bid. 
The adviser may also be able to provide specific information to either the bidder or the target to make them 
more informed about the takeover. Thus the following hypothesis is posited. 
 
H2: The greater the information asymmetry, the more likely an adviser is to be used. 
 
Two of the variables from Servaes and Zenner (1996) are used to proxy information asymmetry: industry 
relatedness, and the number of industries in which the target operates. The other proxy used is a dummy 
equal to one if the bidder is listed. If the bidder is listed, then it is expected that an adviser will be hired to 
reduce the information asymmetry between the shareholders and the managers. The reputational capital of 
the adviser will make the information more credible.  
 
C Adviser Choice Hypothesis 
The IPO and takeover literature contains several hypotheses related to advisers and the type of work 
performed. Nanda and Yun (1997) examine the correlation between market value of the lead underwriter 
and the “success”12 of the transaction it advised. The results show the market value of the lead underwriter 
is directly related to its performance in the IPO. Given the way the league table is compiled, and the 
ranking method used by Rau (1999)13, it is not surprising to find that the key determinant of adviser market 
share is deal completion. Adding value to its client was not found to be a significant determinant of market 
share for the advisers. 
 
C.1 Bargaining Power Hypothesis 
Roll (1986) states “if there were no value at ll in takeovers, why would firms make bids in the first 
place?” There must be something to be gained from a takeover that is unique to a given combination as a 
“target firm cannot be depicted generally as being ‘undervalued’ by the stock market” (Jarrell, Brickley 
and Netter (1987)). Thus, in theory there should be a net gain from a takeover. Assuming a takeover has a 
positive NPV, a higher quality adviser will generate greater benefit for the client from the bid. 
                                                     
12 Success was measured by the degree of underpricing in the IPO advised, with lower underpricing considered to be 
more successful. 
13 Ranking was based on frequency of achieving a market share (based on volume) within certain brackets i.e., top 5 
was first tier, 6-15 was second tier, and 16-¥ for third tier. 
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The more prestigious the adviser, the greater is its reputational capital. Reputational capital aids in 
reducing agency costs. If the adviser has a great deal at stake, then it is less likely to be willing to make 
opportunistic decisions, thus when bargaining its actions should be more credible relative to an adviser 
with less reputational capital. Hence, the more credible the adviser, potentially the higher its bargaining 
powers i.e., higher ranked advisers should be able to use its resources, expertise and bargaining power to 
“negotiate the acquisition at a more favourable offer for the firm they are representing”, see Bowers and 
Miller (1990). Accordingly, we posit that higher ranked advisers have better bargaining power.  
 
H3: Prestigious advisers are more likely to complete “good” deals. 
 
“Good” deals are defined as those where the bidder announcement return is nonnegative. The wi dow over 
which the return is calculated is t-5 o t+5 days.14  
 
D Market Share Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses test what is required for an adviser to have a greater market share. The two 
hypotheses are the superior deal hypothesis, and the deal completion hypothesis (Rau (1999)). The deal 
completion hypothesis states an adviser will have a higher market share by increasing its completion rate. 
Rau (1999) finds little support for the superior deal hypothesis, but a significant amount of support for the 
completion hypothesis.  
 
D.1 Superior Deal Hypothesis  
There are several ways of defining a superior deal. Rau (1999) defined a “
bidder earns a positive short run abnormal return. If bidders want to generate wealth, then it is expected 
that advisers who can aid in completing “good” deals will be rewarded with an increased deal flow. 
Although abnormal returns can aid in identifying “good” deals, th  u e of equal weights places too much 
emphasis on small deals. We incorporate the size of a bid in our analysis by aggregating the wealth of all 
the takeovers an adviser participates in over one year to indicate if the adviser assisted in cr ati g wealth 
for bidders’ shareholders. Wealth will be measured both as an aggregated doll r amount, and as a 
standardised measure. The measure is standardised by dividing the wealth gain to the bidder by deal value. 
Whether this measure is superior relative to returns will be indicated by the hypothesis below. 
 
H4: The greater the wealth created for bidder shareholders, the higher the rank of the adviser. 
 
The final measure of the superior deal hypothesis relates to the division of wealth generated by the adviser. 
A higher quality bidder adviser will negotiate a deal in which the bidder retains a larger proportion of the 
                                                     
14 Several alternative return windows were used (i.e., -10 to +10, -2 to +2 and –1to +1) and produced similar results.
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wealth created. The measure is standardised by dividing the wealth gain to the bidder by the absolute value 
of total wealth created. If the market rewards this, then the adviser will receive greater deal flow, and 
subsequently move up the league table. 
 
H5: The greater the amount of wealth created in the deal retained by the bidder, the higher the rank 
of the adviser in the league tables.  
 
Despite Rau (1999) finding little support for the superior deal hypothesis, it is expected that by examining 
wealth creation (rather than returns) some support for the hypothesis may be found.  
 
D.2 Deal Completion Hypothesis 
The deal completion hypothesis argues that for an adviser to increase its market share, correct valuation of 
a deal for the client is secondary to actually completing the deal. Managers may be fixated on completing a 
deal rather than ensuring shareholders benefit from the takeover. Although Eccl s et al. (1999) discuss the 
range of control mechanism in place when a takeover occurs, they do admit that managers sometimes 
“overlook the numbers”. They argue that successful managers are ambitious people who do not like to 
lose, hence when a deal becomes too expensive managers fixate on winning the “contest” rather than 
ensuring value is added. This is especially the case if the manager will personally benefit from the takeover 
e.g., larger salary and bonus from managing a larger firm. It is expected that the mor  prestigious advisers 
will provide a “no questions asked” type service for its client  the bidder i.e., completion rate is likely to 
be higher the greater the reputational capital of the adviser. Further, only completed takeovers are counted 
in the current league tables. Thu , higher ranked advisers should have a higher completion rate. Hence, the 
hypothesis is:
 
H6: The greater the proportion of deals completed, the higher the rank of the adviser. 
 
E Summary 
The six hypotheses posited above relate to the three mod ls discussed in the next Section. The transactions 
cost (H1) and information asymmetry (H2) hypotheses relate to the adviser used model. The bargaining 
power hypothesis (H3) relates to the adviser choice model. The superior deal hypotheses (H4 and H5) 
suggest the creation of bidder wealth, and higher ranked advisers achieve the retention of a larger 
proportion of the wealth. The deal completion hypothesis (H6) conjectures that the deal completion rate is 
important in determining the ranking of an adviser.  
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IV . Data and Method 
A Introduction 
This Section describes the four data sources, and discusses the three models used to test the six hypotheses 
developed in Section III. The four data sources are: SDC Platinum, ASX Journal, the Core Research 
Database, and FT Extel. The three models are: the adviser usedmodel, the adviser choice model and the 
market share model. The adviser used model and the adviser choice model are based on a takeover-by-
takeover analysis, whereas the market share model is based on annualised data. The variables for all three 
models are discussed individually with a priori expected signs for the coefficien s.  
 
B Data 
The data come from four sources, the SDC Platinum database, the Core Research database (CRD), ASX 
Journals, and FT Extel. The time frame is 1989 to 1998, and contains ll attempted takeovers where the 
bidder is Australian. The bidder has to be Australian; otherwise the price data necessary to test H3 
(bargaining power hypothesis), H4 and H5 (superior deal hypotheses) ar  notavailable from the CRD.  
 
In order to be included in the sample the takeover had to be announced between 1 January 1989 and 31 
December 1998. This identified a total of 4,172 takeovers. All rumored bids were removed leaving 2,610 
takeovers. A minimum transaction size of $500,000 was selected, so as to ensure tha  only economically 
significant takeovers are included. This reduced the sample to 1,326 take vers. The next restriction 
imposed on the data was that the bidder must have intended to hold at least 20% of shares in the target 
after the takeover. The 20% minimum was set to ensure deals involve material control transactions15. 
Imposing this restriction results in a sample of 865 takeovers. 
 
The final restriction was to only include public, private and subsidiary firms. This omitted government 
firms, joint ventures and several firms where the status was unknown. Government firms and joint 
ventures are omitted because their management does not have to respond to the same commercial 
incentives as non-governmental firms. Further, price data are not available for any of these types of firms. 
The final sample contains 801 attempted takeovers.
 
B.1 SDC Platinum 
The SDC Platinum database was selected, as it appeared to be the most reliable and complete source of 
takeover data available in Australia. SDC Platinum has been used in a number of recent takeover papers 
e.g. Rau (1999), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998). Further, the fact that merchant banks themselves use 
                                                     
15 Section 615(7) of the Corporations Law outlines 20% as the minimum percentage at which a person is able to 
potentially control the affairs of the company. 
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SDC Platinum to derive information also increases the credibility of the database as a source of reliable 
data for this study. These factors enhance the external validity of the experiment. 
 
Data availability constraints determined the time frame over which adviser performance is reviewed 
(1989-1998). Prior to 1989, Australian data compiled by SDC are not sufficiently detailed or 
comprehensive. The finishing date of 31 December 1998 was selected to make the sample as current as 
possible, and to mini ze the number of deals still pending.  
 
B.2 ASX Journal 
ASX Journals were used to collect the number of shares outstanding one month prior to the takeover. They 
were also used to identify which firms were listed, and the total assets of each listed firm in the sample16.  
 
B.3 Core Research Data 
CRD supplied day end share prices for each of the listed firms in the sample. The data were used to 
calculate the short run abnormal returns. The Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) 
compiles the data contained in the CRD. The database contains end of day trading prices, volume, and 
dilution factors for all securities listed on ASX.  
 
B.4 FT Extel 
FT Extel supplied the all ordinaries accumulation index values for the full time period. The all ordinaries 
accumulation index was used to approximate the market. The index represents 93% of value and 94% of 
turnover on ASX (see ASX Fact Book (1998)). The all ordinaries accumulation index differentiates itself 
from the all ordinaries index as dividends are notionally reinvested on the ex dividend date. Hence the all 
ordinaries accumulation index approximates a buy-and-hold strategy with 100% dividend reinvestment.  
 
C Adviser Used Model 
There are no legal requirements to use an adviser in a takeover. A bidder can write its own takeover 
documents and submit them to ASX, the ASIC and the target. There are suggestions from Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) that the decision to use an adviser depends on the complexity of the deal, the diversification 
of the target, and the amount of previous experience the bidder has. The following logit model sets out to 
test H1 (transaction cost hypothesis) and H2 (information asymmetry hypothesis). The model is extensively 
based on that contained in Servaes and Zenner (1996).  
 
                                                     
16 Shares Magazine replaced ASX Journal in December 1996; hence between December 1996 and December 1998 
Shares Magazine provided the required information. 
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Adviser Used = a0 + b1Attitude + b2Cash + b3Log(Transaction Size) + b4Log(Previous Acquisitions) 
+ b5Related Industry + b6Log(# Target SICs) + b7Market Reaction + b8Bidder 
Listed + e                  (1) 
 
Adviser Used is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder uses an adviser, and zero otherwise. A 
positive coefficient on any independent variable means the probability of using an adviser is higher when 
the variable increases. 
 
Attitude is a dumy variable equal to one if the acquisition is hostile, and zero otherwise. In a hostile 
takeover the bidder needs to avoid the target’s takeover defenses, convince the board and shareholders that 
the price is appropriate, and that the deal will create value. If  deal is hostile, then an adviser can assist by 
reducing the transaction cost through superior bargaining skills and previous experience. Conversely, an 
adviser may be able to direct bidders to targets that are more likely to be receptive17. Thus a w ak positive 
coefficient is expected for Attitude. A significant positive coefficient will provide support for H1 
(transaction cost hypothesis). 
 
Cash is a dummy variable equal to one if cash is the sole means of payment, and zero otherwise. The more 
complicated the method of payment is, the less likely the target shareholder is to feel comfortable with the 
amount of wealth being offered. Also, the more complicated the method of payment the more expertise is 
needed from an adviser to be able to lend credibility to the offer. Hence, if non-cash compensation is used 
to acquire the target it is more likely that an adviser will be needed to structure the deal, and lend 
credibility to it. Thus, the coefficient is expected to be negative. A negative coefficient supports H1 
(transaction cost hypothesis). 
 
Log (Transaction Size), where Log stands for the natural log, and transaction size is taken to be the price 
paid for the target net of debt. As the model used is a logit, the logarithm of all continuous dependent 
variables is used, see Maddala (1992). With a larger deal there may be a greater need for financing, and it 
is likely that an adviser is hired. Size can also be considered to be a complexity proxy. However, larger 
firms should have more resources to resist a takeover bid. Thus, the larger the transaction size, the more 
likely an adviser is to be hired i.e., a positive relationship is expected. Servaes and Zenner (1996) conclude 
that deal size is a key determinant when deciding to use an adviser. A positive coefficient will support H1 
(transaction cost hypothesis).  
 
                                                     
17 Unfortunately we are unable to observe this procss as SDC only records the outcome, and not the initial decision 
as to whether to make a hostile takeover or choose a friendly target.
 17
Log (Previous Acquisitions) is the number of previous acquisitions performed by a given company, as at 
the date of announcement18. Whether the deal is successful is potentially a product of whether or not an 
adviser was used19. The range of values for this variable is zero to 16. The log is taken20, as the incremental 
experience gained by performing one extra takeover is not expected to be linear. The number of previous 
acquisitions is taken to be a proxy for experience. The more experience a bidder has, the less need it has 
for an adviser, thus the coefficient is expected to be negative. 
 
Related Industry is a dummy variable equal to one if the 3-digi primary SIC code is the same for both the 
target and the bidder, and zero otherwise. If the two firms operate in the same industry, then information 
asymmetries and the difficulties associated with integration are significantly reduced. In such cases, the 
services of an adviser are less likely to be utilised, hence the coefficient is expected to be negative. A 
significant negative coefficient will support both H1 (transaction cost hypothesis) and H2 (i formation 
asymmetry hypothesis). 
 
Log (# Target SICs) i  a complexity measure and is defined as the number of industries in which the target 
operates. As complexity increases so too does the work needed to accurately assess the impact of the 
takeover. The integration process between the target and the bidder is also likely to be more complex, and 
require greater expertise. Thus, the greater the number of industries the target operates in, the more likely 
an adviser is to be used i.e., a positive relationship.  
 
Market Reaction is a dummy equal to one if the short run abnormal return is non-n gative, and zero if the 
return is negative. A high quality adviser should, through their expertise and easy access to capital, be able 
to ensure the deal creates value. On the other hand, if the deal is attempted without the use of an adviser, 
then the bidder may not be able to identify the synergies correctly, thus valuing the target incorrectly and 
potentially paying too much (or offering too little). Hence, contrary to Servaes and Zenner (1996), a 
positive coefficient is expected i.e., a positive return is expected to be associated with deals performed 
with advisers. 
 
                                                     
18 This number was calculated by downloading all takeover attempts contained in the Australian Mergers and 
Acquisitions database in SDC Platinum. This database covers the period from 1984 to current. The bidding firms 
were first ranked alphabetically, and then ranked by announcement date. This was repeated for all bidders contained 
in the SDC database. D als were included independent of their outcome; this is to ensure all attempted takeovers are 
included. This is important, as the greatest amount of work initially is to price the offer correctly and sell it to the 
target. It is also in the initial stages wher  the decision to use an adviser is made. 
19 A weakness of this variable is that the calculation of takeover numbers does not take into account organisational 
changes i.e., two firms merge and form a completely new company trading under a different name. 
20 If the bidder had no previous experience, then Log (Pr vious Acquisitions) is set to zero. For the bidders with 
experience, 1 is added to the logged value. Otherwise, bidders with no experience and bidders who had performed 
one takeover would havethe same value (0). 
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Bidder Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is listed on ASX, and zero otherwise. This 
dummy is included to account for the amount of reputation at stake for the bidder. If an adviser is hired, 
the reputational capital at stake of the bidder is reduced as the adviser assumes most of the completion risk 
(McLaughlin (1992)). Also, the adviser should be able to reduce the information asymmetry between the 
bidder and its shareholders. Hence, if the bidder is listed, then the use of an adviser is more likely, and thus 
the coefficient is expected to be positive. A positive coefficient will support H2 (information asymmetry 
hypothesis). 
 
The adviser used model (1) is run on the entire sample of 801 takeovers.  
 
D Ranking the Advisers 
For each IPO in the US there is a “tombstone” advertisement, that highlights the particulars of t  issue, 
and lists the various financial intermediaries involved. The order of appearance on the “tombstone” 
indicates the rank of the advisers in an IPO. This has been the basis for a ranking method developed by 
Carter and Manaster (1990) and extended by Johnson and Miller (1988) and Megginson and Weiss 
(1991)21. In the takeover literature advisers have been grouped into three categories22, first, second and 
third tier advisers23, where first tier advisers have the greatest amount of reputational ca ital. 
 
Two methods are used to rank advisers, the “look-back” method and the “cumulative ex-
Rau (1999) groups advisers on the basis of the number of times an adviser is ranked amongst the top five 
in the league table (first tier), th  next 15 (second tier) or lower (third tier). The overall ranking assigned to 
an adviser is based on the frequency with which it is in the top five, the next ten, or the rest during the 15 
years which Rau’s sample covers. The advisers were only ranked once, which means Rau assumes the 
ranking of an adviser is permanent. Servaes and Zenner (1996) also keep their rankings constant during 
their entire sample period. This means the ranking is performed ex post, with information the market did 
not have at the time most takeovers were performed. How ver, the nature of the banking industry is such 
that most are competing to be at the top of the table. Maher and Cooper (1996) describe the chang  in the 
“bulge bracket” and refer to the “five contenders to the new bulge bracket”. This suggests that over the 
long run, the ranking of advisers can and does change, hence it is important to have a flexible ranking 
method that allows for m vement between tiers. 
 
                                                     
21 Earlier models by Logue (1973), and Beatty and Ritter (1986) have been discarded in favour of the Carter and 
Manaster (1990) method. 
22 The earliest reference where banks are categorised into brackets comes from Hayes (1971).
23 The literature also terms these Bulge-brack t, Major-b acket, and Sub-Major bracket [see Rau (1999)].  
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D.1 Look-Back Method 
This paper uses a similar ranking method, but avoids Rau’s ex-post ranking complication. The market 
share of advisers is based on a slightly modified league table. Basing the rankings in each year on the 
takeover announcement date, not on the year of takeover completion, modifies the league table. This is 
done to ensure both successful and unsuccessful takeovers are included. 
 
The nature of the data is such that market share will appear to vary significantly i.e., there may be years 
where the market share for an adviser is substantial, then the adviser will disappear from the table for a few 
years. To overcome the problem of advisers not featuring in the rankings table despite having a high 
reputation due to their deals in earlier years, a smoothing approach has been adopted. In addition to the 
one-year rankings, the league tables have been aggregated over rolling tw- and three-year periods. 
 
For each year of each look-bac  period, the advisers are ranked based on their market share. Following 
Bowers and Miller (1990), Servaes and Zenner (1996), and Rau (1999), the top five ranked advisers were 
deemed to be first tier, the next ten are second tier, and the remaining advisers are taken to be third tier. 
 
D.2 Cumulative Ex-Ante Ranking  
Using the “look-back” ranking the top five ranked advisers are given a score of three, the next ten are 
given a score of two, and the remaining advisers receive a one. The division of the tiers is based on Bowers 
and Miller (1990), Servaes and Zenner (1996), and Rau (1999). An adviser is only ranked if it is 
considered to be active. All advisers are assumed to be inactive at the beg nning of the data set (1989), 
once the adviser has participated in a deal it is considered active. The point allocation process is repeated 
for all active firms during the period 1989 to 1998. Instead of calculating an overall ranking at the end of 
the period, the rankings are calculated cumulatively during the period. This allows movement between the 
tiers, and makes the ranking process more dynamic and realistic. The measure does not punish advisers if 
they are new, but penalises those advisers at the fringe who perform deals at irregular intervals. Advisers 
who drop out of the market completely will slowly have their score approach the minimum of one. The 
aggregation builds into the model some degree of memory by the market. 
  
E Adviser Choice Model 
Having decided to use an adviser, the bidder needs to decide on the prestige level of the adviser. This 
choice is modelled via a multi-logit regression. The model is based on Servaes and Zenner (1996), and 
carries over a range of variables from the above Adviser Used Model. The model tests H3 (bargaining 
power hypothesis). The sample for this model contains only takeovers where the bidder used an adviser. 
This limits the sample to 247 takeovers. The model is as set out below:
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Tier = a + b1Attitude + b2Cash Dummy + b3Log(Deal Size) + b4Log(Previous Acq.) + b5Log(#Target 
SIC Codes) + b6Market Reaction + b7Relative Size + b8Sign. Bidder + e                                 (2)
  
Where Tier is equal to three if the adviser involved is third tier; two if the adviser is second tier; and one if 
the adviser is first tier. The way the advisers are labeled in the equation means a negative coefficient on the 
independent variable will be associated w th an increased probability of using a higher ranked adviser. In 
cases where there are multiple advisers, the adviser with the highest tier is chosen to represent prestige 
level of all advisers. This is consistent with Rau (1999), and Servaes and Zenner (1996). The model is run 
using the three look-back measures, and the ex-ant  cumulative ranking method. 
 
The Attitude dummy is equal to one if SDC considers the takeover to be hostile, and zero otherwise. A 
hostile takeover has greater risk of not succeeding as the target uses all means necessary to combat it. 
Hostile takeovers are more risky as their success is by no means guaranteed. As discussed in Section II B.3 
the more prestigious advisers have skills to complete complex deals considered too risky by less 
prestigious advisers. The coefficient is therefore expected to be negative 
 
Travlos (1987), Martin (1996) and Chang (1998) highlight the importance of controlling for the method of 
payment. The Cash dummy variable is used to capture the method of financing used. It is equal to one if 
the bidder pays for the target using cash only, and zero otherwise. Unlike the US and UK, Australia had no 
CGT rollover relief for shareholders accepting share bids. An adviser could use its experience and
knowledge to more accurately assess the relative impact of the CGT, thereby making the offer more 
attractive to the target’s shareholders. Most advisers should have reasonable access to the funding sources 
necessary to complete the acquisition The non-standard bids which use several methods of financing, are 
more difficult to assess, thus more prestigious advisers should be used to assess and structure the deal. 
Therefore a positive relationship is expected.  
 
The Log (Transaction Size) variable is the log of the total value of the deal. It is intended to control for any 
systematic influence due to transaction size, seeCart r, Dark and Singh (1998). The larger the deal, the 
more likely a top tier adviser will want to perform it. A la ge deal will help ensure a placing in the top 
ranks. Thus a negative relationship is expected.  
 
The Log (Previous Acq.) is calculated as discussed in Section IV C. The variable is a measure of 
experience of the bidder. The greater the number of acquisitions performed, the more knowledgeable the 
bidder becomes. The more knowledge a bidder has, the more specific a task an adviser will be hired for. 
Experts generally work in niche areas and do not generate the same volum  of work as the large 
mainstream advisers do. Therefore experts will be ranked lower, thus a positive relationship is expected. 
 21
 
Log (# Target SICs) is discussed above in the advised used model. The gr ater the number of SIC codes 
the target firm has, the more complex the transaction is expected to be. As first tier advisers are expected 
to have more expertise, and a greater wealth of resources to draw on, then a first tier adviser is more likely 
to perform more complex takeovers, hence a negative coefficient is expected.  
 
Market Reaction is the short run abnormal bidder return. If the assumption is made that on average the 
deals which advisers are required to perform are those where credibility is required, then it is expect  that 
the more prestigious the adviser the greater the return will be. Thus the coefficient is expected to be 
negative. If this variable is negative, then it will support H3 (bargaining power hypothesis). 
 
The time window used to assess the market’s reaction i  –5 to +5 days, where 0 is the day the deal is 
announced. By using a short-term window the event can be isolated, and by performing a cross sectional 
regression, the experiment should be able to reduce the amount of noise in the returns. A potential problem 
with this variable is that the market reaction is an ex post measure used to proxy for an ex ante decision 
input24. 
 
The Relative Size difference between the bidder in deal i using adviser j and the target in deal i can have an 
impact on the decision to use a certain tier of adviser. If the bidder is smaller than the target, then it 
requires an adviser with more credibility. The credibility of the adviser will aid in convincing the target to 
sell its shares to the bidder. Hence a negative relationship is anticipated. If the variable is greater than one 
the target is bigger and it is expected the bidder will use an adviser, and vice versa. 
 
Sign. Bidder is a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder, prior to the takeover, owned five percent or 
more of the target’s shares, and zero otherwise25. Bidders with a substantial shareholding have lower 
information asymmetry. Therefore, bidders who are not substantial shareholders are more likely to hire a 
prestigious adviser. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected.  
 
F Market Share Model 
Knowing what makes an adviser move up or down a league table can be very valu ble, as it highlights the 
attributes in advisers that attract bidders. If the league table is intended to rank advisers based on quality 
levels, then this model also tests the league table. Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991) found an inverse 
                                                     
24 Unfortunately revision dates are not disclosed in SDC; he ce the number of revisions made, or the return to the 
target from the revisions, ca not be estimated. 
25 A substantial shareholding is defined in the Corporations Law to be any person who is entitled to not less than five 
percent of voting shares. Once the five percent threshold is reached, the substantial shareholder must give notice 
within two business days of their acquisition. 
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relationship betw en the prestige of the adviser and its performance. (****Check****). If similar results 
are found, it may reflect that the league table is not a good basis for ranking advisers into tiers. 
 
Unlike the models above which were based on individual takeovers, the cr ss- ctional model set out 
below uses annualised data. The data are annualised around each adviser for the period of one year. The 
independent variables are therefore aggregates of the deals performed during the year. The model is based 
on previous research as well as intuition regarding what the market sees as being valuable in a takeover 
adviser. The model should help unlock how an adviser develops and retains its reputational capital (rank), 
and assist in testing hypotheses H4, H5, (superior deal hypotheses) and H6 (deal completion hypothesis). 
 
Market Share = a0 + b0Ability to Complete + b1Last Year’s Market Share + b2Accumulated Wealth 
Gain + b3Merger/Tender + b4Proportion of Acquisitions + b5Average Deal Size + 
b6Time to Complete + b7Attitude + b8SIC Compatibility + e             (3) 
 
The dependent variable Market Share is similar to that used in Rau (1999). It is the market share achieved 
during the year.  
 
An adviser’s Ability to Complete a deal may be a key selling point, especially if the service sold by the 
adviser is a “no questions asked” type agreement. It also measures the ability of an adviser to apply its 
skills. It is calculated as the proportion of successfully completed deals to total deals attempted. 
 
The deals completed and attempted by adviser j are m asured over the period of one calendar year. Rau 
(1999) found that first tier advisers complete more tender offers, but in mergers the third tier advisers 
outperform first tier advisers. If this variable is positive and significant then it supports the deal completion 
hypothesis, as more prestigious advisers will complete more deals. Thus a positive coefficient supports H6 
(deal completion hypothesis).  
 
Last Year’s Market Share is included to determine if the base an adviser built the previous year helped 
generate business the following year. It is an important variable as it controls for the differences in starting 
points for the year i.e., a 2% increase in market share has different implications for an adviser that had a 
4% market share compared to one that had a 10% market share. It is expected that last yar’s market share 
will help generate deals for the adviser the following year. As in Rau (1999), we expect a positive 
relationship.  
 
Accumulated Wealth Gain is calculated three ways: once as a raw wealth gain, and twice after different 
methods of standardisation. The variable assesses the wealth adviser j as assisted in generating during the 
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calendar year, s in Bowers and Miller (1990). Accumulated Wealth Gain is calculated as the increase in 
bidder market value (adjusted for the market index) in the period from the day of announcement until the 
day the deal is withdrawn or completed. This is calculated for all listed bidding firms advised by adviser j
during one calendar year.
 
Presuming that first tier advisers want to protect reputational capital, hese adv sers need not only to 
complete the greatest number of deals, but also to perform deals that show their quality. The greater skill, 
expertise and choice of deals should ensure the first tier advisers are able to generate great r wealth t an 
second and third tier advisers can. Thus, the coefficient is expected to be positive. This would support 
Bowers and Miller (1990) who find the mean abnormal dollar returns and holding period returns are 
significantly greater in acquisitions when a prestigious adviser is employed. The wealth measure is 
standardised in two ways. The first is to divide the bidder wealth gain by the deal value, and the second is 
to divide it by the total wealth created. If the wealth gain is positive then it supports H4 a d H5 (superior 
deal hypothesis). 
 
In Australia, the SDC database does not distinguish between mergers and tenders, but does indicate if the 
deal is either a merger or a tender, as opposed to an acquisition of assets. Therefore, the Merger/Tnde  
ratio is calculated by dividing the number of mergers and/or tenders performed during the calendar year by 
the total number of deals performed. It is expected that sales of assets require a different skill set, and a 
greater client base to find an appropriate buyer i.e., higher ranked advisers are expected to have the 
expertise required to perform the sale of assets. Thus, less prestigious advisers will perform more merger 
and tender offers; therefore the coefficient is expected to be positive. 
 
In the US, target advisers are on average paid 30% more than advisers acting for the bidder, see 
McLaughlin (1990). For that reason some advisers may choose to act mainly for targets. The Pr portion of 
Acquisitions variable measures the number of deals adviser j performs as an adviser for bidding firms as a 
proportion of the total number of deals. Acting for the target takes less time from an adviser’s perspective 
as the target hires its adviser after the bidder does. Thus advisers who act for more targets can perform 
more deals in a year. Therefore a positive coefficient is expected. 
 
The Average Deal Size s included to control for any systematic differences in th  size of deals performed 
by advisers. It is also included to determine if first tier advisers have their market position simply from 
performing large deals. If first tier advisers perform larger deals, then the coefficient should be positive.  
 
The Time to Complete variable measures the average time (in days) taken to complete the takeovers 
(announcement date until withdrawal or acceptance of offer) for an adviser in a given year. This is a 
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complexity measure. The longer a deal takes to complete the more complex it is. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is unknown as a positive coefficient may indicate a deal is complex, and that first tier advisers 
are the ones who perform the deals. Alternatively, a negative coefficient may mean th  more prestigious 
advisers are better at dealing with complex takeovers and complete them more swiftly. 
 
The Attitude of a deal may be an important determinant of the prestige level of adviser chosen. The 
annualised variable is calculated as the number of hostile deals divided by the total number of deals. 
Hostile takeovers have greater risk of not succeeding. Thus, to reduce the time and cost of completing a 
hostile takeover, the experience and resources available to more prestigious adviser is important. This is 
opposite to what Servaes and Zenner (1996) expected. They expect more prestigious advisers will avoid 
hostile takeovers as the risk of jeopardising the adviser’s reputational capital. However, Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) find no evidence that a particular category of bank is overwhelmingly used when the acquisition is 
hostile. Thus a positive coefficient is expected. 
 
The last complexity measure used is the SIC Compatibility ratio. The ratio also proxies for the amount of 
information asymmetry that exists between the bidder and the target. The dummy variable is set to one if 
the primary 3-digit SIC code of the two firms are identical, and zero otherwise. The ratio is calculated as 
the number of identical 3-digit SIC code deals performed by adviser j, ivided by the total number of deals 
for adviser j. More prestigious advisers have more experience and greater resources available to them, so it 
is anticipated that they will be able to complete more complex takeovers. Since the SIC compatibility ratio 
is equal to one if the deals are all simple, then the relationship between the ratio and the level of prestige is 
expected to be inverse. Thus a negative coeffici nt is anticipated.  
 
The cross- ectional market share model above is developed to highlight what bidders consider important. 
Our approach is somewhat unique as it is annualised for each adviser. The independent variables are 
therefore aggregates of the particular attributes of the deals performed during the year. The league table is 
supposed to rank advisers based on perceived quality levels. If other deal attributes are overlooked, then 
the league table is capturing the wrong quality measure and n eds improvement. The model should also 
help unlock how an adviser develops and retains its reputational capital (rank).  
 
G Summary 
The four data sources used in the three models have been developed to test the six hypotheses set out in 
Section III. The adviser used model specifically targets H1 (transaction cost hypothesis) and H2 
(information asymmetry hypothesis), and aims to examine the externally observable factors that make a 
bidder choose to attempt a takeover over with or without an adviser. Using a reduced sample of 247, the 
adviser choice model tests H3 (bargaining power hypothesis). That is, are higher ranked advisers associated 
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with “good” deals? The unique annualised data used in the market share model examines H4, H5, (superior 
deal hypotheses) and H6 (deal completion hypothesis). The model is designed to determine if the league 
table is a good measure of adviser quality. The next Section discusses descriptive statistics, as well as the 




The following results relate to descriptive statistics for the main sample, as well as the three models, the 
adviser used model, the adviser choice model, and the market share model. This is followed by a 
sensitvity analysis that examines the impact of other ranking methods on the hypotheses developed in 
Section III. The Section concludes with a suggestion for a new wealth ranking measure. 
 
B Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1 shows the variation in volume of deals over time, and the relative distribution of the volume 
between takeovers with and without advisers. The figure is based on data from SDC Platinum and covers a 
larger sample than that used in the regression models of this paper. An examination of Figure 1 i dicates 
several salient trends. The total market for takeovers experienced a slump during the period 1989 until 
1994, after which the volume of takeovers grew very rapidly. Another observation from Figu e 1 is that 
although there appears to be a core volume of deals performed every year without an adviser, the greatest 
growth has occurred in the part of the market using an adviser. This could be due to the advisers more 
actively suggesting deals to potential bidders. The data in Figure 1 highlight a shift in the proportion of 
deals using an adviser around the year 1994/5. The proportion of takeovers performed without an adviser 
appears to have experienced a permanent downward shift, from around 40 percent prior to 1994 to slightly 
less than 20 percent from 199526. 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 are based on the main dataset of 801 individual takeovers. There were 401 
takeovers where no advisers were utilised, and 400 deals where at least one adviser was involved. There 
was a greater use of target advisers (328) relative to bidder advisers (247). This suggests targets either did 
not want to be taken over (and employed advisers to help defend against unwelcome bids), or were more 
anxious to ensure a “good” outcome was achieved for t eir shareholders.  
 
It is also evident in Table 1 that most of the takeovers in the sample were performed in the latter part of the 
period. The last three years account for 60.8% of the sample. T re is only one year (1991) where the 
percentage of bidder advised deals (26.19%) exceeds the percentage of target advised deals (21.43%). 
                                                     
26 This may also be a reflection of the database, as SDC confirmed the database was more extensive after 1995. 
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However, when the proportion of the total value of deals completed with the help of an adviser is 
compared with the proportion of volume of deals assisted by advisers in Figure 1, it becomes evident that 
the deals performed by advisers are large. In 1998, 42.18% of takeovers in the sample used an adviser, yet 
Figure 1 indicates the value of deals with n adviser in 1998 was more than 80%.  
 
Table 2 gives general statistics for the full sample, for takeovers without an adviser, and for takeovers with 
a bidder adviser, and the breakdown of the prestige level of those advisers. Some interesting differences 
become evident once the full sample is partitioned. If a deal uses an adviser and the deal is completed, then 
the median time it takes to complete the deal (86 days) is almost three times as long when compared t  
completed takeovers performed withoutan adviser (31 days). The shorter time taken by deals with no 
advisers may be due to those deals being smaller, generally friendly and less complicated. Hence we 
cannot attribute the increase in deal completion time to the presence of advisers. 
 
A greater number of takeovers are completed when the bidder uses an adviser (82.19% versus 71.12%), 
thus while it may take longer to complete a deal with an adviser,the eal is more likely to be completed. It 
is interesting to note that second tier advisers (73.08%) lag behind first (89.87%) and third tier advisers 
(83.33%) when it comes to completion rates. A possiblereason for the higher completion rate in the third 
tier may be the presence of niche operators having superior skills in a narrow field.  
 
The size of the takeover appears to help differentiate between the tiers; although this is not surprising 
given the tiers are based on volume of deals completed. The largest deals on average are performed by first 
tier advisers ($A100.1m), then second tier advisers ($A83.0m), third tier advisers ($A42.7m) and finally 
without ($A10m) an adviser. Deals where no adviser is used involve bidders that are almost wice (1.99)
the size of their targets. Thi  indicates that if there is no adviser present, that the bidder does not dominate 
or intimidate its target. In fact the largest size discrepancy is in deals performed by first tier advisers (4.84) 
followed by second tier (4.51) and finally third tier (2.26).
 
Table 2 suggests a bidder is more likely to hire an adviser, as opposed to performing it without assistance, 
if: the bidder is listed (70.44% versus 57.94%), has previous experience (59.52% versus 43.84%), does not 
pay cash (64.71% versus 78.16%), and wants to perform a hostile takeover (21.86% versus 4.51%). These 
findings suggest that advisers are able to perform certain types of takeovers better than idd s alone, and 
that method of payment is an important consideration when choosing to use an adviser. It is surprising to 
note that first tier advisers advise the greatest proportion of bidders with previous experience (63.29%). 
This can be due to first tier advisers being involved with larger clients who can make several takeovers, or 
it might reflect some form of relationship banking. If the results reflect relationship banking, then a league 
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table would be used to reaffirm the advisers continued ability to generate deal flow, and pot ntially also to 
draw in new clients.  
 
It is very evident that hostile takeovers are generally performed using an adviser (21.86% versus 4.51%). 
The honour seems to befall second tier advisers (28.21%) more often than first(20.25%) or thd tier 
(17.78%) advisers. Perhaps this is a reflection of the current climate of large-scale mergers; hence first tier 
advisers are involved with the large mergers, leaving hostile takeovers to be performed mainly by the 
second tier advisers. Alternatively first tier advisers avoid hostile deals since they result in little value 
being added to the bidder. However, later results suggest this is not the case.  
 
Deals using an adviser are more often well received by the market (34.41%) than if no adviser is used 
(28.43%). It should be noted that the majority of deals earn a negative return upon announcement. Bidders 
in takeovers involving second (43.59%) and third (33.33%) tier advisers more often capture more than 
50% of the value generated than bidders with first tier advisers (21.84%) and in deals where there is no 
adviser (28.16%). Takeovers that are advised by first tier ($A0.70m) and second tier ($A2.76m) appear to 
create value for the bidder more than 50% of the time.  
 
Table 3 reports the takeover related returns earned by ASX-listed sample firms around the bid 
announcement period. The returns are buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the event windows indicated in 
the first column. The returns that are statistically different from zero are in bold. The longer returns 
windows are those that are generally significant (day –60 o 0, -60 to +2, -30 to +2). The returns over 
periods that exceed five days after the takeover (day 0 to +5, 010 and 0 to completed/withdrawn) are 
not significantly different from zero in any of the breakdowns. An interesting observation is that none of 
the mean returns reported in the Table are significantly negative. Only bidders who used a second tier 
adviser earned significant positive abnormal returns around the time of the announcement. This suggests 
the second tier advisers may price their initial offer lower than others, such that the wealth retained by the 
bidder exceeds that which would otherwise ave been earned. It should be noted that the returns are 
equally weighted, that is, a 5% abnormal return on a $100 million dollar market capitalisation carries the 
same weight as a 5% abnormal return on a $20 million firm. This may bias the results agains  first tier 
advisers. However, as first tier bidders are larger then the returns are expected to be relatively smaller. 
From this initial analysis it would appear that second tier advisers are the ones who add value, but appear 
not to receive the largest volume of deal flow.  
 
C The Adviser Used Model 
Table 4 contains the results of seven regression estimates for the advi er used model. The model is 
estimated using a logistic regression; hence R2’s are not reported. The F-statistics and associated p-values 
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are all highly significant, suggesting a reasonable fit. Regression 1 is the full model. It contains both listed 
and unlisted firms, hence the use of the Bidder Listed ummy control. The model suggests a bidder is more 
likely to use an adviser if it is listed and intends to perform a large, hostile deal, for a diversified firm in the 
same primary industry, and using other forms of payment than just cash. The positive coefficient on 
Attitude, negative coefficient on the Cash and positive coefficient on Log (Transaction Size) variables 
support H1 (transaction cost hypothesis). The positive coefficient on Bidd r Listed supports H2 (information 
asymmetry hypothesis), but the positive coefficient on Related Industry is inconsistent with both H1 
(transaction cost hypothesis) and H2 (information asymmetry hypothesis). 
 
When the number of observations used in the model is reduced, and the Market Reaction variable is 
substituted for the Bidder Listed variable (regression 2), then the F-statistic on the model becomes smaller, 
but remains highly significant. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients for the independent 
variables remain similar to those in regression estimate one. 
 
When the model is run for only unlisted bidders (regression 3), a number of previously significant factors 
become insignificant. It would appear that when the bidder is unlisted, then a  advis r is more likely to be 
chosen if the deal is hostile, the transaction is large, and the target is diversified, however the method of 
payment and the relatedness of the target’s industry are insignificant.  
 
Bidders who have no prior experience (regression 4) are more likely to hire an adviser if the deal is hostile, 
requires non-cash finance, is large, and if the target is diversified with the target’s core industry being 
similar to the bidder’s. If the bidder does have previous experience (regression 5), then th  only difference 
to inexperienced bidders is that the method of payment becomes insignificant. This suggests advisers are 
able to add value in ways other than by merely providing relatively easy access to capital. The Bidder 
Listed variable is insgnificant in regression 4 and 5, so there is no support for H2 (information asymmetry 
hypothesis). 
 
If there is a target adviser present (regression 6), then the important determinants again are: whether the 
deal is hostile, if the deal is large, whether the wo firms operate in the same industry, and whether the 
target is diversified. This suggests that if the target uses an adviser, then the negotiation skills are more 
important than being able to provide easy access to capital. However, if no target adviser is pres nt 
(regression 7) then the attitude, non-cash payment, the size of the deal, and the diversification of the target 
are important factors in choosing to use an adviser. 
 
Overall the adviser used model supports H1 (transaction cost hypothesis) but finds limited support for H2 
(information asymmetry hypothesis). The findings also suggest the adviser is not hired for a set range of 
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reasons. It appears that the circumstances surrounding the takeover determine which skills the bidder is 
seeking from its adviser. 
 
D The Adviser Choice Model 
The adviser choice model utilises the look-back ranking described in Section IV D.1 as well as the ex-ante 
cumulative ranking method set out in Sectio IV D.2. The look-back ranking was devised to build some 
degree of market memory into the measure of adviser quality. 
 
The adviser choice model in Table5 is estimated using a multi-logit regression. The model is estimated 
four times, once for each of the look-back measures, and once for the ex-ante cumulative ranking measure. 
The reason for the two intercepts is that there are three unique values the dependent variable takes o ; 
hence the estimation is performed in three-dimensional space, rather than the two-dimensional space of 
standard logit.  
 
For all four models the F-statistic is insignificant, which suggests any inferences drawn from the 
coefficients of the model must be interpreted with caution. The fact that Market Reaction is not significant 
means there is no support for H3 (bargaining power hypothesis). The only significant variables are Attitude 
and Cash. The positive coefficient on Attitude suggests less prestigious advisers are more often associated 
with hostile takeovers. The negative coefficient on the Cash variable suggests lower ranked advisers 
perform deals with more complicated financing, and perhaps that higher ranked advisers are able to more 
often raise the required debt finance for its bidderclient. The lack of significance in all four models 
suggest the ranking on the league table is not a good indication of the attributes of an adviser’s ability or 
quality that we would expect to be relevant to bidders. An alternative explanation is that the releva t 
attributes have been measured with too much error for the results to be significant. 
 
E The Market Share Model 
The market share model is estimated using two different definitions of market share. In one measure the 
denominator is the total volume of deals in the market, in the other measure the denominator is the total 
volume of advised deals i.e., a subset of the total market.  
 
The results in Table 6 suggest the method used to rank the advisers (i.e., market share) is not an indicator 
of other aspects of quality. The only variable that is significant is last year’s market share. This suggests 
advisers are more or less entrenched in their position. It also indicates that last year’s league table is a good 
proxy for this years market share i.e., a good marketing tool. However, it is a marketing tool that does not 
indicate anything about quality. The sign on the accumulated wealth gain, and the ability to complete are 
in the wrong direction, albeit they are not significant. The lack of signific nce mea s there is no support 
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for hypotheses H4, 5, (superior deal hypotheses) or H6 (deal completion hypothesis). This is despite the 
model having significant F values, and a reasonable R2.  
 
F Sensitivity Analysis  
The lack of significance in the adviser choice model and the market share model has lead to the following 
sensitivity analysis. Here we develop various other models to test the hypotheses of this study. 
 
F.1 – Adviser Choice Model with Rankings 
With the lack of significance observed in the original adviser choice model in Table 5, it was felt that the 
cut-off used to distinguish the tiers could cause incorrect conclusions. Accordingly, we test the sensitivity 
of the results to alternative definitions of the depend nt variable. Instead of using the tier to which the 
adviser belongs, the actual adviser ranking is used as the dependent variable. The ranking used is the ex 
ante cumulative rank described in S ction IV D.2. The ex ante cumulative rank was extended to be 
calculated over three bases: cumulation of the one year scores, the cumulation of a two-year r lling 
average, and the cumulation of a rolling three-year average.  
 
Table 7 shows that changing from tiers to rankings improved the goodness of fit, with the F statistic 
becoming significant for all seven estimated models. For regression 1, the size of the deal is the most 
important variable when d ciding on what prestige level of adviser to use. The negative coefficient 
indicates that higher ranked advisers perform larger deals. The marginally significant cash variable 
suggests the complicated financing deals are performed by lower ranked advisers, and that the higher 
ranked advisers have their clients pay in cash. Perhaps this reflects the strong capital backing of the more 
prestigious advisers, and the ability to provide debt finance to the bidder from within the “one-  
 
When the rolling average is extended to two years (regression 2), size no longer is important, instead the 
significant variable becomes the log of previous acquisitions. The negative coefficient indicates the more 
deals performed previously, the more likely a bidder is to us  a higher ranked adviser. Since size is 
insignificant there are two possible explanations for the significance of the previous acquisition variable. 
Firstly, repeat bidders realise the value an adviser can add, and may consider that higher ranked advisers 
do a better job. Secondly, higher ranked advisers may be better at suggesting acquisition partners, thereby 
establishing a good rapport with the bidder, leading to repeat business between the two. In the two and 
three year models the market reaction is also marginally significant. The positive coefficient suggests hat 
deals advised by less prestigious firms are better received by the market. This is inconsistent with H3 
(bargaining power hypothesis). Extending the rolling average to three years (regression 3) sees the method 
of financing become insignificant, and size becoming significant again.  
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Regression 4 extends the window used to calculate the abnormal announcement return. The window is 
extended from day –1 to +1 to be an 11-day window, i.e., –5 to +5. The positive significant variable 
suggests less prestigious advisers work on takeovers that earn greater announcement period returns. 
Extending the window further (regression 5) to day –10 to +10 reaffirms the direction and significance of 
the return. The direction of the coefficient is opposite to that expected and rejects H3 (bargaining power 
hypothesis).  
 
In regressions 6 and 7 various dummy variables are inserted to test the robustn s of the findings. In 
regression 6, the log of previous acquisitions is removed, and in its place is a dummy to capture whether 
the bidder has any prior experience. The dummy is significant, the negative coefficient suggesting that 
more experienced bi ders choose to use more prestigious advisers. The interesting observation is that size 
becomes a more significant variable, which may indicate Log (Previous Acquisitions) u ed in the previous 
estimates to a certain extent is capturing the size of th b dder. In regression 7 the new variable is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the bidder has a significant holding in the target, and zero otherwise. 
According to the Corporations Law s707, a person holding more than 5% of the target is a significant 
shareholder. The lack of significance for the variable suggests the foothold the bidder has in the target is 
not a consideration for most bidders when choosing the prestige level of the adviser.  
 
The sensitivity analysis indicates H3 (bargaining power hypothesis) is rejected, and that less prestigious 
advisers earn greater announcement period returns f r their clients. Further, the longer the period of time 
used to rank advisers, the greater the number of adviser aspects highlighted by the rank. Th  resul s 
indicate the cumulative three-year rolling average is the best way to extend the period.  
 
F.2 Market Share Model with Rankings 
The models estimated in Table6 failed to find support for H4, H5, (superior deal hypotheses) and H6 (deal 
completion hypothesis). This sensitivity analysis, like the one above, re-estimates the model using 
rankings. Firstly the ranking will be the simple look-back measures described in Section IV D.1, then the 
cumulative ex ante rankings will be used.  
 
All models in Table 8 have significant F statistics, and reasonable R2’s. For regression 1 the only variable 
that is significant is last year’s market share. This is similar to the results of Table 6. Ex ending the look-
back time frame to two (regression 2) and three years (regression 3) suggests the proportion of wealth 
obtained by the bidder is a significant determinant of current market share. The negative coefficient 
suggests higher ranked advisers capture greater rents on a consistent basis for the bidder. This provides 
some support for H5 (superior deal hypothesis). In addition to this, the compatibility of the bidder and the 
target also appears to be an important determinant. The negative coefficient indicates more prestigious 
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advisers perfom relatively more takeovers where the bidder and the target operate in the same primary 
industry. This may be an indicator of some degree of industry specialisation by higher ranked advisers. 
The coefficient also suggests that lower ranked advisers perform the mo e complicated deals. Perhaps this 
is because the higher ranked advisers have the ability to choose from a range of projects, therefore 
selecting those projects that are least likely to damage their reputational capital. Despite having to perform 
the more complicated deals, earlier results in Section V B show that second tier advisers are better at 
generating wealth for the bidder, hence this perhaps indicates that reputation is not built up by creating 
value, but by having a significant deal flow. 
 
In the models that incorporate the cumulative ex ante ranking (regressions 4, 5, and 6), the F values 
increase. The ability to complete a deal becomes a significant variable. Surprisingly the coefficient is 
positive. This suggests lower ranked advisers are able to complete more of the deals attempted. This is 
opposite to what was expected by H6 (deal completion hypothesis). Last year’s market share remains an 
important explanatory of this year’s rank. The longer the period of time over which the cumulative ex ante 
measure is calculated, the less significant the SIC compatibility variable become. This suggests higher 
ranked advisers do not always have the luxury of picking the deals they are involved in. The cumulative ex 
ante rank based on the two and three-year rolling average is negatively associated with the proportion of 
wealth captured by the adviser. This supports H4 (superior deal hypothesis). The final variable that is 
significant across all three ex ante models is Attitude, which indicates advisers who perform hostile deals 
are more likely to be ranked higher. It is surprising to see that the SIC Compatibility changes sign when the 
ranking method changes. The significant positive variable in regression 4 suggests lower ranked advisers 
perform deals with less information asymmetry. This is opposite to what the “look-back” measures in 
regressions 1 to 3 found. However SIC compatibility is significant in only one of regressions 4, 5 and 6, 
and thus any relationships are tenuous.  
 
F.3 Completion Rates Between the Tiers 
To determine if there is a significant difference in completion rates between the tiers, t-tests were 
calculated27. Completion rates are not reported in tables, however, in summary, it appears that first tier 
advisers (89.87%) have a higher completion rate than second tier advisers (73.08%), and a higher 
completion rate than if no adviser were present (71.12%). This supports H6 (deal completion hypothesis) 
i.e., higher ranked advisers complete more deals. However, there is no significant difference between the 
completion rates of first (89.87%) and third tier (83.33%) advisers. A possible reason for this that hird tier 
advisers are hired for simpler deals that are easy to execute and complete.  
 
                                                     
27 These results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Second tier advisers (25.64%) withdraw relatively more deals than first (10.13%), and third tier (13.33%) 
advisers, and there are more withdrawn second tier advised deals (25.64%) than withdrawn deals involving 
no adviser (12.27%)28. Thus second tier advisers appear to be lacking the ability to close out a deal. This 
provides some support for H6 (deal completion hypothesis), that is, bidders prefer first tier advisers because 
they are more capable of completing a deal. However, the number of observations in the Table are 
relatively low for some of the categories, hence the interpretations need to be qualified.  
 
A second analysis of completion rates was performed after partitioning the sample into “good” deals, and 
ls are takeovers where the abnormal announcement day bidder return (day –1 to 
+1), is non-negative. The results are not reported in detail, however a pervasive observation is that deals 
performed with advisers have a higher completion rate for both “good” 
exception is that second tier advisers do not complete a significantly different number of “bad” deals than 
deals with no adviser do. The withdrawal rates for “good” deals do not differ significantly29.  
 
First tier advisers (88.89%) complete significantly more “bad” deals than second tier (68.63%) advisers 
and more than if no adviser were present (73.77%). This suggests first tier advisers provide a “no questions 
asked” type of service, which places deal completion above all else. This may indicate that the market 
considers deal completion a key quality. If management i itiates a takeover and approaches an adviser, 
then if the adviser rejects the deal because it does not create value, then it is likely that the bidder will 
continue to go to advisers until one agrees to advise on it. First tier advisers may still protect their 
reputational capital by ensuring the deals they are involved in are more likely to complete. 
 
Second tier (68.63%) completion rates are below those of first (88.89%) and third tier (82.76%) advisers, 
and on par with deals performed without an adviser (73.77%). As the results indicate second tier advisers 
(29.41%) also withdraw more “bad” deals than first (11.11%) and third tier (15.52%), as well as deals with 
no advisers (11.76%). Perhaps this indicates that second tier advisers are more concerned with ensuring 
value is created than ensuring the deal is completed.  
 
F.4 Capturing Wealth Between the Tiers 
To explore the area of wealth creation further an analysis of the proportion of wealth captured was 
performed. The sample was partitioned into tiers, and also into two groups. In one group the overall 
outcome of the deal was wealth creation, for the other group overall wealth was destroyed. Wealth is 
defined as the change in market capitalisation of the bidder, divided by the absolute value of the sum of the 
                                                     
28 It is possible that deals involving no advisers may underreport withdrawal rates. If this is the case, then the 
percentage is also overstated.  
29 The analysis was repeated using a window of –5 to +5 to indicate whether a deal was considered to be “good” or 
s were obtained. 
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change in market capitalisation of the bidder and the change in market capitalisation of the target. Change 
in market capitalisation is adju te  for index movements and is measured from the day of announcement 
until the day of completion or withdrawal. 
 
The results in Table 9 suggest that first tier advisers do not perform a “superior” deal. That is, second tier 
advisers capture more of the wealth for the bidder in takeovers where wealth is created than first tier 
advisers (75.34% compared with 34.99%), and first tier advisers do not generate significantly more wealth 
creation than third tier advisers (11.56%), or deals without an adviser (-6.20%). This supports Rau (1999). 
Second tier advisers (75.34%) capture significantly more wealth than third tier advisers (11.56%). In 
takeovers where overall wealth is destroyed, the difference in wealth captured is not significantly different, 
except hat first tier advisers (-137.71%) destroy more bidder wealth than takeovers performed without an 
adviser (-69.40%). Although there are significant differences in the “withdrawn” column, the lack of 
observations do not allow for meaningful interpretation.  
 
When wealth is created it appears that the gains are divided between the bidder and the target. Second tier 
advisers appear to be able to capture a majority of the wealth for their bidders, as the mean wealth captured 
in a completed wealth creating deal is 75.34% i.e., for every $A100 wealth created in the takeover, the 
bidder receives $A75.34. This is the only figure that exceeds 50%. For takeovers where wealth is 
destroyed it is evident that the bidder is left with the bulk of the losses. The smallest loss is made by deals 
performed without advisers, where the bidder captures 69.40% of the loss. For wealth destroying takeovers 
that involve an adviser, any gains are on average captured by the target. A percentage that exceeds 100% 
in the “wealth destroyed” columns indicates that the bidder’s share price decreased, and that wealth was 
transferred to the target. The 137.71% loss experienced by bidders who use second tier advisers indicates 
for every $37.71 increase in wealth by the target, the bidder lost $137.71. The fact that the loss is greater 
for second and third tier advisers suggests they are not able to limit the losses to the same extent a first tier 
adviser can, however the differences are not significant. 
 
Overall there is some weak support for second tier advisers being able to capture slightly more value for 
the bidder. However if the overall deal wealth is negative, then second tier advisers appear unable to 
reduce the losses to the same extent as first tier advisers and others are able. This final observation is not, 
however, significant. These results indicate the ranking of advisers on league tables does not indicate the 
underlying quality of the advisers, thus no support exists for H5 (superior deal hypothesis).  
 
G Wealth Creation Ranking 
Given the results above, it appears that the SDC league table in its current form is not consistently 
capturing aspects of quality other than volume and perhaps completion rate. Managers represent 
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shareholders, and should therefore strive to add value to the company, for this reason it may be more 
appropriate to rank advisers on their ability to capture wealth for the bidder.  
 
G.1 Calculation of the Wealth Creation Ranking 
With the wealth measure below, the focus is on bidders, as targets should always increase in wealth30. The 
wealth measure developed by this paper is: 
 













The measure is the division of the wealth added to the bidder, divided by the number of advisers working 
on a given deal. Wealth is measured as the change in market capitalisation of the bidder from the time the 
bid is announced, until the takeover is completed, or withdrawn. The division by the number of advisers in 
each deal is done such that the gains are shared between the advisers, and so that a $10 million gain on a 
deal performed by one adviser is given twice the value of a $10 million gain on a deal performed with two 
advisers. The numerator is then summed befor being divided by the weight d value of all deals the 
adviser has participated in.  
 
The denominator, like the numerator, is a weighted total of all deals in which the adviser has been 
involved. Like the numerator, the denominator is summed prior to division, if this were not done, then th
weighting would be superfluous, and the measure would simply become a summation of averages.  
 
The above wealth creation scores are calculated on an annual basis for each adviser, after which the 
advisers’ scores are ranked from highest to lowest. 
 
G.2 Discussion of the Measure 
The measure approaches the ranking procedure from a different perspective than the current league table. 
In order to rank higher on the wealth league table the adviser has to participate in takeovers that create 
shareholder wealth. The focus has shifted from the number of deals, and the size of the deals. In shifting 
from these measures smaller advisers who work in niche markets can be recognised for doing a good job. 
Working in a particular segment of the takeover market does not handicap smaller advisers.  
 
                                                     
30 A bid has to exceed market price otherwise there is no incentive for the target to sell. 
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The measure thus has a number of benefits including being standardised, shifting the focus to shareholder 
wealth creation, and considering the completion risk and role an adviser has in the deal. However, there are 
also shortcomings in the measure. 
 
Wealth creation is currently only observable fo  bidders that are listed. Although wealth is still created or 
destroyed in deals where the bidder is not listed, accurate measurement of this is almost impossible. By 
focusing only on listed bidders a number of deals will be left out of the measure31. In addition th  measure 
does not consider the quality of work performed for targets. A potential extension to the measure would be 
to include the wealth created for targets it in the measure, such that the measure would represent the whole 
market and not justthe market for bidder advisers.  
 
G.4 Testing the Wealth Creation Measure  
Substituting the lagged ranking into the market share model tests the wealth creation model. By lagging 
the wealth creation ranking H4 (superior deal hypothesis) and H6 (deal completion hypothesis) are tested. 
The market share model is estimated three times, once for each “look-back”. For the 2- and 3-year “look-
backs”, the lagged wealth rank is estimated over a two or three year periods, and lagged by two or three 
years. In order for the regressions to be estimated all variables have to be available. The reduction in 
sample size comes mainly from the fact that advisers have to be in the sample for both the year of the SDC 
ranking, and the previous year for the wealth creation ranking to be calculated.  
 
The model estimates are shown in Table 10. In regression 1 the positive significant variable on the lagged 
wealth rank suggests, that advisers who add value to their clients, are rewarded the following year with an 
increase in deal flow i.e., a higher rank on the league table. This supports H4 (superior deal hypothesis) and 
differs from the findings of Rau (1999). This result is important, as it appears managers of bidders do 
consider their shareholders when choosing an adviser. That is, if an adviser is seen by the market to have 
added value to bidders then the current bidders are more likely to direct their deals towards more capable 
advisers.  
 
When the measure is lagged two years, and compared to the two year rolling average market share, the 
wealth creation measure remains significant, but the model itself is no  well specified. If the ranks are 
averaged over three years, again the model is not well specified, with a negative R2, and an ins gnificant F 
value.  
 
                                                     
31 In the sample of 801 takeovers used in this paper, 60.7% of all bidders were listed. They represented 66.5% of the 
deal values (measured as the deal valu  net of debt).  
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Although the results that the market appears to reward advisers who create value a number of caveats need 
to be considered. The sample size of the takeovers used to estimate the model is relatively small (between 
32 and 49 takeovers). The fact that the goodness of fit of the model declines sharply also indicates the 
model may not be very well specified. In order to properly test this wealth measure a larger sample size 
would have to be used.  
 
VI . Conclusion 
Using a sample of 801 Australian takeovers contained in SDC Platinum attempted between 1989 and 1998, 
this paper investigated the following three issues. What deal attributes motivate some bidders to engage 
advisers? What factors do bidders consider when choosing the prestige level of an adviser? D es capturing 
greater value for the bidder result in a greater market share? 
 
The results suggest that the circumstance under which the deal is performed dictates the deal attributes 
sought by the bidder. If the bidder is listed, has previous experience, does not pay solely with cash and 
wants to perform a hostile takeover then it is more likely t  use an adviser. The results supported H1 
(transaction cost hypothesis), but not H2 (information asymmetry hypothesis). Further, if deals are 
performed using an adviser then it is more likely to be well received by the market. It should be noted that 
the majority of deals are still negatively received; suggesting wealth creation for bidders is not he main 
priority for advisers.  
 
The adviser choice model found no support for H3 (bargaining power hypothesis). The four estimates of 
the model were not well specified; hence the inferences drawn from them should be interpreted with 
caution. The significant coefficients suggest that more prestigious advisers were not associated with hostile 
takeovers, but more prestigious advisers were associated with cash acquisitions. This suggests more 
prestigious advisers protect their reputational capital, and can provide relatively easy access to debt 
financing should its clients require it.  
 
The market share model found no supp rt for H4, H5 (superior deal hypotheses), or H6 (deal completion 
hypothesis). The lack of support for the superior deal hypothesis is consistent with Rau (1999), however 
the lack of support for the deal completion hypothesis is inconsistent with Rau (1999). Potentially the 
initial ranking method used in this paper may not be the ideal way to assess advisers’ performance. 
 
Further analysis does indicate higher ranked advisers do complete more deals than second tier advisers, but 
not third tier advisers. First tier advisers are also more likely to force a “bad” deal to completion. By 
changing the dependent variable from tiers to ranks the adviser choice model also highlights that the 
league table is not a good indicator of other quality attributes i.e., neither deal completion nor wealth 
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creation were significant. The market share model with rankings reaffirmed this by finding that the most 
important determinant of this year’s market share is last year’s market share. The market share model also 
finds that less prestigious advisers wo k on deals that e rn greater announcement returns, and are able to 
capture a greater amount of the wealth created in a takeover on a consistent basis. The conclusion from this 
Section of analysis suggests first tier advsers do not perform superior deals. When wealth is created then 
second tier advisers capture more than twice the wealth of first tier advisers. However, when overall 
wealth is destroyed there is little difference between the tiers. 
 
The SDC produced leagu table is a key marketing tool used by advisers to generate future revenue. The 
way the league table is calculated may be parsimonious and easy to interpret, but it does not capture key 
quality aspects i.e., there is no regard to completion rates or shareholder wealth creation. Based on the 
above results it was concluded that a new wealth creating ranking measure needed to be developed. This 
paper proposes the wealth creation ranking method. The measure attempts to address some of the 
shortcomings of the existing league table. It is a standardised measure of the amount of wealth the bidder 
adviser assists in creating for bidder shareholders. It has the benefit of targeting desirable behaviour i.e., 
wealth creation. To date it has only been possible to estimat  the wealth using listed bidders in the sample, 
and it relies on the market for an accurate assessment of the wealth created by the takeover. The results 
generated from the wealth creation league table indicate that advisers who generate wealth in the previous 
period are rewarded in the following ne year and two year periods with an increase in deal flow. 
However, creating wealth last period does not mean the bidder becomes a first tier adviser the following 
year. It should be noted that the results of the wealth creation measure are encouraging but further 
verification is needed using a larger sample size.  
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Table 1 Distribution of Advisers 
Distribution of 801 Australian takeovers from 1989 through to 1998. The proportions in the All Takeovers column are the percentages relative to the total 
number of takeovers performed (801). The proportions in the “With an Adviser”, “Without and Adviser”, “With an Bidder Adviser”, and “With a Target 
Adviser” columns, are the proportions that group of advisers represent for that year i.
takeovers in with an adviser represented 44% of the twenty five takeovers in 1989.  
 
All Takeovers With an Adviser1 Without an Adviser2 With an Bidder Adviser3 With a Target Adviser4 Year 
Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion 
1989 25 3.12% 11 44.00% 14 56.00% 6 24.00% 7 28.00% 
1990 23 2.87% 5 21.74% 18 78.26% 3 13.04% 3 13.04% 
1991 42 5.24% 14 33.33% 28 66.67% 11 26.19% 9 21.43% 
1992 34 4.24% 23 67.65% 11 32.35% 17 50.00% 18 52.94% 
1993 51 6.37% 30 58.82% 21 41.18% 22 43.14% 22 43.14% 
1994 50 6.24% 27 54.00% 23 46.00% 19 38.00% 25 50.00% 
1995 89 11.11% 58 65.17% 31 34.83% 30 33.71% 50 56.18% 
1996 92 11.49% 65 70.65% 27 29.35% 48 52.17% 61 66.30% 
1997 101 12.61% 43 42.57% 58 57.43% 26 25.74% 33 32.67% 
1998 294 36.70% 124 42.18% 170 57.82% 65 22.11% 100 34.01% 
Total 801 100% 400 n/a 401 n/a 247 n/a 328 n/a 
 
Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
1 – With an Adviser – the deal includes at least one adviser involved in the deal. The adviser can work for either the target or the Bidder. 
2 – Without an Adviser – neither the Bidder nor the target employ the services of an adviser during the course of the takeover. 
3 – With a Bidder Adviser – The deal is performed using at least one Bidder adviser. 
4 – With a Target Adviser – The deal is performed using at least one target adviser. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 















Observations 801 401 247 79 78 90 
Median time to completed 55 31 86 87 92 83 
Median time to withdrawe 85 79 90 84 86 102 
Completion ratiof 74.53% 71.12% 82.19% 89.87% 73.08% 83.33% 
Withdrawal ratiog 13.48% 12.27% 16.19% 10.13% 25.64% 13.33% 
Median deal size (net of debt)  $A 
millions 
21.3 10.0 72.0 100.1 83.0 42.7 
Median relative Sizeh 2.28 1.99 3.33 4.84 4.51 2.26 
Proportion of bidders listedi 61.80% 57.94% 70.44% 72.15% 66.67% 70.00% 
Identical 3-digit SIC code  35.83% 33.57% 40.89% 41.77% 42.31% 38.89% 
Same ultimate parentj 8.99% 9.03% 8.91% 10.12% 8.97% 7.78% 
Bidders with previous experience 48.68% 43.84% 59.52% 63.29% 61.54% 54.44% 
Hostile deals 9.86% 4.51% 21.86% 20.25% 28.21% 17.78% 
Pure cash acquisitions 74.03% 78.16% 64.71% 65.82% 73.08% 56.67% 
Percent owned prior to 
acquisition 8.91% 8.98% 8.75% 6.36% 10.41% 9.42% 
Percent owned after acquisition 66.73% 63.90% 73.07% 77.19% 65.04% 76.41% 
Percent seeking to own after 
acquisitionk 
91.22% 88.93% 96.37% 93.18% 97.39% 98.30% 
Market reacts positivelyl 31.46% 28.43% 34.41% 32.91% 32.05% 37.78% 
Bidder captures >50% of wealthm 22.78% 28.16% 10.73% 21.84% 43.59% 33.33% 
Median value added to bidder 
($A million) -0.09 -0.19 -0.18 0.70 2.76 -1.31 
Median value added to target ($A 
million) 1.36 0.08 6.43 13.24 6.40 2.90 
(a) No Adviser – neither a target nor a bidder adviser participated in the deal. 
(b) Bidder Adviser – at least one bidder adviser was participated in the deal.
(c) The descriptive statistics are for deals with at least one bidder adviser. 
(d) Time to complete - the number of days from announcement until deal is complete. 
(e) Time to withdraw - the number of days from announcement until deal is withdrawn. 
(f) Completion ratio is calculated as: the number of deals completed, divided by the number of deals attempted. 
(g) Withdrawal ratio is calculated as: the number of deals withdrawn, divided by the number of deals attempted (note there are 
96 deals still “pending” in the sample, hence the completion and withdrawal ratios do not sum to 100%).
(h) Relative size is Total Assets of the Bidder, divided by Total Assets of the Target. 
(i) This is the percent of deals where the bidder is a publicly listed company. 
(j) The percentage indicates the proportion of deals where the target and the bidder have the same ultimate parent. 
(k) The stake the bidder would hold if all shares bid for were acquired. The percentage is the sum of the shares owned prior to 
the acquisition and the number of shares seeking to be purchased during the takeover. 
(l) The percent of deals where the abnormal announcement day return (day –5 to +5) is positive. Only listed bidders included.  
(m) If the dollar return of the bidder exceeds the dollar return of the target then the bidder has captured more than 50% of 
wealth. Sample size reduced as only takeovers with listed bidder and target can be used. 
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Table 3 Announcement Period Returns 
The Table below presents the mean abnormal buy-and-hold returns earned by bidders for the periods indicated using the various level of advisers. 
 
All Listed Bidders No Bidder Adviser Bidders Using First 
Tier Advisers 
Bidders Using Second  
Tier Advisers 
Bidders Using Third  
Tier Advisers 
Window 
(Days relative to 
announcement) Return % 
(n = 486 
) 
Student-t Return % 
(n = 314 
) 
Student–  Return % 








(n = 63 ) 
Student–  
 
-60 to 0  4.007*** 3.422 3.938
** 2.524 4.081* 1.746 3.972* 1.790 4.319 1.167 
-60 to +2   4.421*** 3.643 4.302*** 2.626 4.443* 1.786 4.936** 2.185 4.569 1.276 
-30 to +2  2.900*** 3.097 2.221* 1.882 3.843 1.325 3.037 1.539 5.322* 1.858 
-10 to +10  1.216** 2.186 0.578 0.854 1.137 0.625 1.929 1.478 3.881** 2.187 
-5 to +5  1.132** 2.244 0.587 0.967 1.114 0.793 2.793* 1.858 2.494 1.478 
-2 to +2   0.695* 1.65 0.706 1.204 0.064 0.095 1.365* 1.850 0.657 0.574 
-1 to +1  0.342 0.987 0.049 0.108 -0.250 -0.471 2.100** 2.646 0.887 0.759 
0 to +2  0.465 0.207 0.398 0.763 0.276 0.451 1.023* 1.689 0.508 0.578 
0 to +5  0.387 0.929 0.110 0.206 1.140 0.887 0.726 0.979 0.807 0.646 
0 to +10  0.366 0.792 -0.013 -0.022 0.914 0.597 0.790 0.854 1.411 1.122 
0 to Completed  1.408 0.817 2.191 0.871 0.303 0.078 4.671 1.396 -3.490 1.013 
0 to Withdrawn   -0.501 -0.293 -2.319 -1.331 8.976 0.879 2.246 0.701 7.313 0.780 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*  Significant at the 10% level
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Table 4 Adviser Used Model 
The adviser used model below tests H1 and H2. It is estimated using a logit regression. The dependent variable in all cases is whether or not the bidder chose 
to use an adviser. The dummy is equal to one if the bidder used an adviser, and zero otherwise. A viser Used = a0 + b1Attitude + b2Cash + 
b3Log(Transaction Size) + b4Log(Previous Acquisitions) + b5Related Industry + b6Log(# Target SICs) + b7Market Reaction + b8Bidder Listed + e 
(for further discussion on the variables see Section IV C.). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are determined using one- ailed t-
test cut-off values, as there are a priori expectations on the variables. 
 
 Full Model –  
no returns 























































































































Market Reaction - 0.037
*** 
(0.015) - - - - - 
Bidder Listed 0.393
** 









F-statistic  191.635*** 112.091*** 83.312*** 90.835*** 88.014*** 75.967*** 39.660*** 
Observations 801 486 315 411 390 328 473 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level
*  Significant at the 10% level
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Table 5 Adviser Choice Model 
The adviser choice model tests H3. The model is estimated using the following multi-lo it regression. Tier = a + b1Attitude + b2Cash Dummy + 
b3Log(Transaction Size) + b4Log(Previous Acq.) + b5Log(#Target SIC Codes) + b6Market Reaction + b7Relative Size + b8Significant Bidder 
+ e. The dependent variable varies depending on the ranking method. The dependent variable is one if a first tier adviser is used, two is a second tier 
adviser, and three is a third tier adviser. The data used for this regression is based on a sample of 247 takeovers. This is the number of takeovers in 
the main sample where a bidder adviser has been involved. The regression is only run if all variables are available for a given takeover. Numbers in 
parentheses indicate the standard errors. There are a priori expectations for all the variables, thus one-tailed student-t values are used. 
 








     





















Slope coefficients     


























































Observations 56 55 54 56 
F-statistic  5.135 5.303 9.836 5.450 
 
       ***  Significant at the 1% level
       **   Significant at the 5% level
       * Significant at the 10% level
 47
 
Table 6 Market Share Model 
 
The market share model tests H4, H5, and H6, and is estimated using an OLS regression. Market Share = a0 + b0Ability
to Complete + b1Last Year’s Market Share + b2Accumulated Wealth Gain + b3Merger/Tender + b4Proportion of 
Acquisitions + b5Average Deal Size + b6Time to Complete + b7Attitude + b8SIC Compatibility + e. The dependent 
variable in all cases is the market share of the adviser. The data used for this regression is aggregated for each adviser 
on a per-anum basis. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors adjusted f r heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). As 
there are a priori expectations for all the variables, the t-tests are one tailed. 
 






































Slope coefficients on:       
























Accumulated wealth gain -0.000 (0.000) - - 
-0.000 
(0.000) - - 
Bidder wealth per deal - -0.845 (1.079) - - 
-0.414 
(0.834) - 
Proportion of wealth created - - 0.053 (0.098) - - 
0.033 
(0.075) 


































































Observations 71 75 71 71 75 71 
F-statistic 4.132*** 5.050*** 4.144*** 5.189*** 6.108*** 5.197*** 
Adjusted R2 28.43 32.69 28.49 34.72 38.01 34.73 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*    Significant at the 10% level
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Table 7 Sensitivity on Adviser Choice Model 
The adviser choice model Rank = a + b1Attitude + b2Cash Dummy + b3Log(Transaction Size) + b4Log(Previous Acq.) + b5Log(#Target SIC Codes) + 
b6Market Reaction + b7Sign. Bidder + e (discussed in Section IV E.) is estimated using OLS. It tests H3. The dependent variable is the ranking obtained 
from the Ex Ante Ranking Procedure discussed in Section IV D.2. The data used for this regression is based on a sample of 801 takeovers. The observations 
contained in the “Observations” column indicate the number of takeovers in each regression. Numbers in parentheses indicate the heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors (White, 1980).  
 
Dependent Variable 1-Year 
Ex Ante Rank 
2-Year  
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Year 
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Year 
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Year  
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Year 
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Year 
Ex Ante Rank 

















Slope coefficients ona:        






















































Previous acquisition dummy - - - - - -2.999
** 
(1.435) - 

















(0.078) - - - - 
Market Reaction (-5 to +5) - - - 0.090
** 
(0.048) - - - 


















Significant shareholder - - - - - - 0.064 (1.324) 
Observations 171 169 167 167 167 167 167 
F-statistic  1.990* 2.236** 2.280** 2.522** 2.594** 2.598** 2.595** 
Adjusted R2 3.89 4.87 5.09 6.00 6.26 6.28 6.27 
       ***  Significant at the 1% level
       **   Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 8 Sensitivity on Market Share Model 
The market share model Rank = a0 + b0Ability to Complete + b1Last Year’s Market Share + b2Accumulated Wealth per Deal + b3Merger/Tender + 
b4Proportion of Acquisitions + b5Average Deal Size + b6Time to Complete + b7Attitude + b8SIC Compatibility + e (described in Section IV F.) is 
estimated using an OLS regression. The regressions tests H4, and H5, and H6. The dependent variable in this sensitivity analysis is the rank attained by the 
adviser. The data used for this regression is aggregated for each adviser on a per- num basis. Numbers in parentheses are heterosc dasticity adjusted 
standard errors (White, 1980).  The Rank measure aggregates the deals done by the adviser over a 1, 2 or 3 year period. The ex Ante rank is based on the 
rank achieved by an adviser based on its points scored during the years it has been active. As there are a priori expectations for all the independent variables, 
the significance level cut-offs are calculated based on one-tailed t- ests.  
 






Ex Ante Rank 
1-Yr Look-Back 
Ex Ante Rank 
2-Yr Look-Back 
Ex Ante Rank 
3-Yr Look-Back 















Slope coefficients ona:       





































































































Observations 75 75 73 75 75 73 
F-statistic 4.154*** 3.327*** 2.945*** 10.176*** 8.331*** 11.057*** 
Adjusted R2 27.46 21.83 19.34 52.41 46.80 55.36 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level
**    Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level
 50
 
Table 9 Wealth Captured by Various Adviser Tiers for Deals that Create or Destroy Wealth 
The Table assesses if there is a difference between the wealth retained between tiers, and between deals where 
wealth is created, or destroyed. The student t- tatistic calculated for each paring indicates whether there is a 
significant difference between means of the two tiers. The classification method used is based on the 1-year look-
back method. Wealth is created when the sum of the dollar gain to the bidder plus the dollar gain to the target 
exceeds zero. The sample is slightly reduced, as the wealth measure requires both the target and the bidder to be 
listed. 
 
 Overall Wealth Created Overall Wealth Destroyed 
 Completed Withdrawn Completed Withdrawn 
     
First Tier Adviser 34.99% (25) 69.14% (2) -114.94% (17) -70.75% (4) 
Second Tier Adviser 75.34% (22) -12.34% (7) -137.71% (15) -79.30% (1) 
t-statistic (p-value) 2.118 (0.040) -1.259 (0.251) 0.464 (0.650) 0.136 (0.900) 
     
First Tier Adviser 34.99% (25) 69.14% (2) -114.94% (17) -70.75% (4) 
Third Tier Adviser 11.56% (16) -53.73% (6) -125.52% (22) -119.33% (3) 
t-statistic (p-value) -0.730 (0.473) -3.092 (0.021) 0.190 (0.851) 1.357 (0.233) 
     
First Tier Adviser 34.99% (25) 69.14% (2) -114.94% (17) -70.75% (4) 
No Adviser -6.20% (57) 60.08% (20) -69.40% (69) -63.84% (15) 
t-statistic (p-value) -0.714 (0.478) -0.304 (0.768) -2.487 (0.018) -0.218 (0.864) 
     
Second Tier Adviser 75.34% (22) -12.34% (7) -137.71% (15) -79.30% (1) 
Third Tier Adviser 11.56% (16) -53.73% (6) -125.52% (22) -119.33% (3) 
t-statistic (p-value) -1.968 (0.062) -0.570 (0.582) -0.171 (0.865) 0.902 (0.462) 
     
Second Tier Adviser 75.34% (22) -12.34% (7) -137.71% (15) -79.30% (1) 
No Adviser -6.20% (57) 60.08% (20) -69.40% (69) -63.84% (15) 
t-statistic (p-value) -1.410 (0.164) 1.069 (0.316) -1.427 (0.174) -0.263 (0.797) 
     
Third Tier Adviser 11.56% (16) -53.73% (6) -125.52% (22) -119.33% (3) 
No Adviser -6.20% (57) 60.08% (20) -69.40% (69) -63.84% (15) 
t-statistic (p-value) -0.280 (0.780) 2.559 (0.028) -1.027 (0.316) -2.084 (0.105) 
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Table 10 Market Share Model with Lagged Wealth Ranking 
The market share model Rank = a0 + b0Ability to Complete + b1Lagged Wealth Rank + 
b2Merger/Tender + b3Proportion of Acquisitions + b4Average Deal Size + b5Time to 
Complete + b6Attitude + b7SIC Compatibility + e (described in Section IV F.) is estimated 
using an OLS regression. The dependent variable in all cases is the rank of the adviser (based on 
attempted deals), calculated over the past 1, 2 or 3 years. The data used for this regression is 
aggregated for each adviser on a per-annum basis. Numbers in parentheses are 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors (White, 1980). As there are a priori expectations for 
the coefficients one tailed cut-offs are used to test for significance. 
 
Dependent Variable 1 Year Rank 2 Year Rank 3 Year Rank 









Slope coefficients ona:    




















































Observations 44 49 32 
F-statistic 3.192*** 1.416 0.322 
Adjusted R2 28.50 6.35 -0.2043 
 
***   Significant at the 1% level
**    Significant at the 5% level
*     Significant at the 10% level
 
(a) Ability to complete – total number of deals completed, divided by total number of deals attempted. 
Lagged wealth rank – is the rank achieved by an adviser in the previous year after being ranked on the measure 
described in Section V G.1. 
Merger/Tender – a proportion that divides the number of mergers and tenders attempted by the adviser, by the total 
number of deals attempted. 
Proportion are acquisitions – the number times the adviser worked for bidders, divided by the sum of deals attempted 
for bidders and deals attempted for targets.  
Average deal size, is the sum of the value of all deals attempted (net of debt) divided by the number of deals. 
Time to complete, is the average time taken from announcement of the takeover until the deal is completed. 
Attitude is the proportion of all deals attempted which have been hostile in nature. 
SIC compatibility is the ratio of the number of times a deal has involved bidders and targets with the same 3-digi  
primary SIC code, divided by the number of deals attempted.  
